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Information about intentions, aspirations, and introspections (i.e., agentic information) is more central 
to people's representation of themselves than to their representations of other people.  In particular, 
people think of themselves, relative to other people, more as free agents, whose intentions and 
aspirations have the power to shape the course of their lives with minimal influence from extraneous 
sources.  In six studies, I explore the nature of this self/other asymmetry and the factors that give rise to 
the conception of one's own decisions, relative to those of the average person, as more exogenous (i.e., 
as arising from more active, unconstrained choice).  The first two studies provide evidence that, relative 
to how they view others' decisions, people see their own daily decisions more as the product of active 
choice.  Studies 3A and 3B demonstrate that people see their own decisions, relative to the average 
person's, as freer from extraneous influence, and that this estimate for the self overestimates actual 
decision exogeneity.  The final two studies test a proposed explanation for the illusion of exogeneity: 
The meta-cognitive experience of indecision.  When simulating the decision-making of a known other, 
people experience less indecision than when they decide for themselves.  They see others' decisions as 
starting from a more biased point and progressing faster than their own decisions.  This difference in 
meta-cognitive experience provides one explanation for why people remain unaware of extraneous 
constraints on their own decisions, while maintaining relative accuracy about the extent to which these 
variables exert a direct impact on others.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is mounting evidence that people see themselves, more than they see other people, 
as the masters of their own fate.  People think they have more free will in their own lives than 
other people do (Pronin & Kugler, 2010).  They feature information about intentions (Koehler & 
Poon, 2006; Kruger & Gilovich, 2004), aspirations (Helzer & Dunning, 2012), plans (Buehler, 
Griffin, & Ross, 1994), potential (Williams, Gilovich, & Dunning, 2012), and hopes and dreams 
(Williams & Gilovich, 2008) more in their representations of self than in their representations of 
other people.  When looking at themselves, people see comparatively more potential for agentic 
behavior – i.e., behavior that allows for the active shaping of one's life – than they see in other 
people, something Helzer & Dunning (2012) referred to as an agency bias.  The studies 
presented herein attempt to explore the nature of this bias in self- and social-understanding and 
to shed light on some of the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to the illusion of asymmetric 
agency for self and other.
To understand how, exactly, self and other are seen as differing in their capacity for 
agency, consider the following attributional trade-offs documented in past work.  People place 
more emphasis on intentions and desires when explaining the causes of their own behavior than 
when explaining another person's behavior (Pronin & Kugler, 2010).  Concurrently, they de-
emphasize the impact of variables that may constrain their own capacity for freely-chosen action, 
while remaining aware of the constraints these same variables place on others' free choice.  For 
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example, people underestimate the impact that situational forces can have on their own behavior, 
but anticipate the influence of these same forces on others (Balcetis & Dunning, in press). 
People are also less aware of bias in their own decisions than they are the decisions of their peers 
(Pronin & Kugler, 2007).  They downplay the importance of past behavior when considering 
their own future achievement potential, though they attend to this same information in others 
(Helzer & Dunning, 2012).  Finally, people seem less aware of when they, themselves, are 
susceptible to peer influence (Pronin, Berger, & Molouki, 2007) or ulterior motives (Epley & 
Dunning, 2000), but show comparative insight into how these same forces can unwittingly 
determine others' decisions, undermining their capacity for free choice.
The guiding idea that permeates the studies that follow is that people feel they are more 
exogenous decision-makers (Hagmayer & Sloman, 2009) than others are.  By exogenous, I mean 
that people see themselves, compared to others, as agents who play a more active role in shaping 
the course of their lives, and whose decisions are comparatively freer from direct extraneous 
influence1.  By contrast, people understand others' decisions and behaviors more in terms of the 
broader social-psychological context from which they emerged (i.e., more endogenously), and 
less in terms of the agent's independent, exogenous choices.  Because they fail to register the 
impact of these same extraneous variables on their own decisions, people live with the illusion 
that their own choices and decisions are freer than those of people in general (cf. Pronin & 
Kugler, 2010).  
In Chapter 2, I explore the first premise of this argument.  Studies 1 and 2 test the extent 
1 I  use the term “extraneous influence” throughout to denote any causal factor that might exert an influence upon 
an agent's choices and decisions that is itself not a feature of the agent's willful choice.  This includes factors that 
are external to the agent, such as peer influence, norms, and situational forces.  Though not directly tested here, it 
may also include forces within the agent that nonetheless limit the agent's free choice (such as her biases, 
competing motivations, and habitual behaviors).
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to which people see themselves, relative to others, as active authors of their lives.  In both 
studies, participants considered a series of daily decisions, and indicated that their decisions, 
relative to those of another person, involved more active choice and deliberation.  Chapter 3 
explores the second premise of the argument; namely, that people overestimate the extent to 
which their own decisions and choices are exogenous.  In these studies, participants estimated 
the impact that extraneous influences would have on their own decisions, as well as the impact 
these influences would have on the decisions of another person.  Going beyond a basic self/other 
difference in perceived impact of these influences (Pronin et al., 2007), the studies in Chapter 3 
assessed the accuracy of these beliefs in order to determine whether the amount of exogeneity 
seen in self or other proves more insightful with regard to actual behavior.
Chapter 4 examines the source of the illusion of exogeneity.  In contrast to past work 
related to this question, which emphasizes the relative centrality of introspective information to 
representations of self and other (Pronin, 2009; Pronin & Kugler, 2007, 2010), I begin with the 
premise that asymmetries in decision exogeneity reflect differences in the meta-cognitive 
experience of decision-making.  In other words, when people ask themselves whether their own 
or another person's decision was free from extraneous influence, they start by “trying on” the 
decision-making that they or the other person went through to arrive at their conclusion.  Study 4 
demonstrates that the meta-cognitive aspects of this decision simulation are different, depending 
upon whether one is simulating one's own or a known other's decision.  
Study 5 ties these differences in meta-cognitive experience to self/other asymmetries in 
decision exogeneity.  To preview the findings somewhat, people experience the decisions of a 
known other as starting from a more biased point and as progressing toward a conclusion more 
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quickly than they experience their own decisions.  Thus, others' decisions are experienced as 
more “foretold” from the very beginning than one's own.  This difference serves as a partial 
explanation for why people perceive their decisions as freer of extraneous influence.  Data from 
Study 5 also allow for an exploration of accuracy with regard to this belief.  Do people have any 
insight into their actual decision progress?  Leaning on early speculations from Griffin and 
Tversky (1992), I tested whether people underestimate just how far along their decision-making 
actually is – and thus, just how much freedom they have at any one point to choose otherwise.
Self/other asymmetries in free will:  Conceiving of the self as an exogenous agent
The term free will is, by all counts, a conceptual morass (Dennett, 1984), and so to say 
that people conceive of themselves as having more free will than other people requires some 
clarification.  Pronin and Kugler (2010) operationalized free will along a number of classic 
attributes.  They found, for example, that people believed their own past and future were less 
predictable than those of another person.  Participants also saw more possibilities in their own 
future than the future of a peer; and they attributed behavior to intentions and desires more for 
the self than for other people.2
Another sense in which people may see themselves as possessing more free will than 
others is in conceiving uniquely of their own choices as exogenous causal variables (Hagmayer 
& Sloman, 2009).  Consider the following two ways in which people may think of a choice.  On 
one hand, people may see choice as an endogenous property of the decision-making context: 
they see (as social scientists might, for example) choices as emerging from a stream of social-
2 Note that only the last of these conceptualizations of free will has anything to do with agency for self over other. 
This is notable given that less predictability and more numerous possibilities are not themselves indicative of the 
kind of free will that seems most important to people – i.e., the capacity to actively author the course of their 
lives.
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situational forces, each of which helps determine the eventual decision.  On the other hand, 
people may see choice as an exogenous variable – a carefully conceived decision that exists 
independent of the broader decision-making context and serves to intervene upon the external 
world to shape a person's fate (see Hagmayer & Sloman, 2009 for further discussion).  
Figure 1 presents a rough depiction of these different models of choice.  Panel A 
represents the exogenous model of choice.  In this model, a person's deliberation and choice are 
conceived of as independent inputs into a person's behavior, inputs that are themselves largely 
unswayed by the person's social-psychological context (situational constraints, habits, peer 
influence, biases, and ulterior motivations, etc.).  Deliberation and choice exert a direct influence 
on the person's eventual behavior, whereas extraneous factors (labeled social-situational forces) 
exert only an indirect influence on behaviors and decisions.  Contrast this with the endogenous 
model of choice depicted in Panel B.  In this, a person's broader social-psychological context 
exerts a direct influence on the choices the person makes; these deliberative states and choices 
are then only indirectly related to the ultimate decision that is made. 
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Using a series of scenario studies, Hagmayer and Sloman (2009) illustrated the sense in 
which choices may be viewed as exogenous.  In one study participants were told that exercise is 
associated both with decreased food intake and with the presence of a specific neurotransmitter; 
more specifically, that having a particular neurotransmitter causes both greater exercise and 
decreased eating.3  Participants were then asked to imagine that a friend of theirs had recently 
started exercising and eating less, and that the increase in exercise was due to one of three 
causes.  In the “choice condition,” the person had chosen to exercise; in the “intervention 
condition,” the person had been forced into exercising; in the “observation condition,” the cause 
3 The authors also included a second condition, the “causal chain” condition, in which participants were told that 
exercise leads to increases in the neurotransmitter, which then leads to decreased eating.  Regardless of choice 
condition, participants estimated it equally likely that the friend possessed the neurotransmitter.
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Figure 1: Two models of choice:  exogenous (panel a) and 
endogenous (panel b).  Dark lines represent direct influences 
between variables.  Dotted lines represent indirect influences 
between variables.
of the exercise was unspecified, participants had just observed that the friend was both exercising 
more and eating less.  Participants in each condition were asked to estimate the likelihood that 
the friend possessed the neurotransmitter, given the observed increase in exercise and decrease in 
eating.
The results demonstrated that people think of choices as interventions, i.e., as exogenous 
causes of behavior.  Participants attributed the exercise to the neurotransmitter only in the 
observation condition.  Interestingly, participants did not differentiate between the choice 
condition and the intervention condition.  When it was clear that the exercise was forced upon 
the friend, participants thought (rightly, it would seem) that they could infer nothing about the 
presence of the neurotransmitter.  Remarkably, though, participants gave the same response for 
the choice condition.  
Thus, the data suggest that in participants' minds, choices were conceived of in the same 
way that external interventions were:  As causes existing independently of the broader network 
of cause and effect, which exert a direct effect upon the person's eventual behavior. 
Demonstrations by Hagmayer and Sloman (2009) never systematically tested whether the 
perception of exogeneity extends to others in the same measure as it extends to the self, but for 
reasons outlined here, it seems likely that self-perceived exogeneity is even greater than that 
observed in their studies.
The exogenous-endogenous distinction in choice fits nicely with another line of work on 
conceptions of choice – this one from the cultural literature.  Markus and Kitayama (2003) have 
hypothesized that cultures may differ in their conceptions of agentic behavior along a continuum 
much like that proposed by Hagmayer and Sloman.  Specifically, they posit disjoint versus 
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conjoint models of agency.  Cultures favoring disjoint models of agency situate agentic behavior 
inside the individual – agentic behavior is that which involves the individual imputing his or her 
will upon the external world, shaping it to his or her desires, preferences, and beliefs.  Cultures 
favoring conjoint models of agency, on the other hand, count responsiveness to the world, other 
people, social roles, and norms as agentic behavior.  Thus, in these cultures one may be seen as 
an agent not by rejecting or acting out against a prescribed social role or situational influence (as 
one would in a disjoint context), but by acting in accordance with this broader social structure, 
cohering one's behavior to a collective pull.
The disjoint/conjoint distinction tends to characterize agency as it is seen in European 
American and Asian contexts, respectively, although additional work has extended it to broader 
differences in individualism and collectivism that may arise from factors other than geographical 
location, such as socio-economic status (Stephens, Fryberg, & Markus, 2011; Stephens, 
Hamedani, Markus, Bergsieker, & Eloul, 2009).  
Applying these models to self and other.  The hypothesis tested in Chapter 2 is that 
people construe their own choices and decisions differently than they construe of the same 
choices and decisions of other people.  The dimension upon which this asymmetry is expected to 
vary is the extent to which choices are viewed as exogenous (or disjoint) inputs into behavior.  I 
expected that relative to how they view other people's behavior, people will understand their own 
behavior more as the product of active choice, an independent and considered intervention upon 
the world that shapes their fate.  The role of active, exogenous choice will play a more minor role 
in people's understanding of the forces giving rise to others' behavior.
Two sets of existing findings lend indirect support to this hypothesis.  First, in their 
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predictions of the future, people seem to give more weight to their own acts of will than to 
another person's.  For example, people think that strong intentions will matter more for 
determining their own behavior than for determining the behavior of a random peer (Koehler & 
Poon, 2006; Pronin & Kugler, 2010).  They also think that their aspirations are more informative, 
and past behavior less informative, with regard to what they will achieve than to what a peer will 
achieve (Helzer & Dunning 2012).  Thus, people seem to think that they, more than others, are 
capable of altering the trajectory of their own behavior, even against extraneous forces that may 
threaten to constrain them.  At the same time, there is evidence that people see themselves as less 
influenced by a variety of extraneous forces than others are (Balcetis & Dunning, in press; 
Douglas & Sutton, 2008, 2010; Perloff, 1993, 1999; Pronin et al., 2007).  They do not apply their 
wisdom of how these forces shape others' behavior to their understanding of the self, leaving 
them unaware of just how endogenous their own choices really are.
Endogenous for you, exogenous for me:  Self/other perceptions of conformity and social  
influence
A start-point for understanding when and how people see their own choices and decisions 
as more exogenous than others' comes from the psychological literature on perceptions of 
conformity and social influence.  Conformity, or adherence to norms, peer influence, or other 
social forces, is a powerful determinant of social behavior (Asch, 1956; Milgram, 1974; Prentice 
& Miller, 1996), yet recent research suggests that people are rather blind to recognizing when 
their own behavior is shaped by conformity pressures – especially in cases where “doing what 
others do” is seen as an illegitimate course of action. 
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There is evidence that people see themselves as less susceptible to conformity than the 
average person (Pronin et al., 2007).  In one demonstration, for example, Pronin and colleagues 
asked iPod users whether their decision to purchase an iPod was driven by social pressure (to fit 
in or to align their preferences with those of their peers).  Participants reported that relative to the 
average peer, their decision to purchase an iPod was driven less by social pressure.  Participants 
reported this even when led to believe that going with the group carries a host of benefits to the 
self and others, suggesting that the pressure to see oneself as a non-conformist outweighed any 
fleeting message that acting conjointly with others was a positive quality.  
In another study, Princeton students were asked whether they supported or opposed a 
series of academic proposals.  As they were making their decisions, the experimenters biased 
participants toward particular issues by providing them with recommendations from a panel of 
Princeton students.  Later on in the study, participants were asked about the extent to which they 
versus a peer (whose responses were actually the participant's own, thinly veiled) had been 
influenced by the recommendations of the panel.  Although participants' own positions and those 
of their “peer” showed the same number of conforming responses, participants thought that the 
other person had been more influenced by the position of the panel than they themselves had.
These demonstrations are consistent with the idea that people register the social-
psychological pressures that constrain others' choices, but deny the impact of these same forces 
on their own choices.  Thus, they are consistent with the hypothesis that people see their own 
decision-making as more exogenous than others'.  However, these studies do not allow for an 
exploration of whether decisions on the part of the self are actually more exogenous than the 
decisions other people make.  Are self-perceptions of conformity underestimating actual 
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conformity?  Are peer-perceptions of conformity overestimating conformity?  These questions 
are largely open for empirical investigation.  
One line of work that potentially speaks to the question of accuracy is research on the 
third-person effect in communications.  The third-person effect focuses upon people's 
perceptions of the extent to which they relative to other people are susceptible to media 
influence.  In a typical study, people report that others are generally more swayed by media 
information than they themselves are (Davison, 1983; Perloff, 1993, 1999).  Douglas and Sutton 
(2008), for example, manipulated participants' suspicions surrounding Princess Diana's death and 
then asked them to rate the plausibility of a number of conspiracy theories related to the manner 
of her death.  After this, participants were asked how they, or how the average person, would 
have rated the plausibility of the conspiracy theories prior to having read the suspicious 
information about Princess Di's death.  The researchers compared participants' estimates of the 
amount of attitude change they or someone else had experienced/would experience after being 
exposed to the suspicious information to the actual change prompted by the information (gleaned 
from a control condition in which participants merely rated the plausibility of each of the 
conspiracy theories).
Results indicated that participants underestimated the impact that the suspicious 
information had had on their own ratings of the conspiracy theories.  However, participants' 
ratings of the effect of the suspicious information on others roughly approximated the observed 
effect of the information.  This result – that people were accurate with regard to others' attitude 
change, but inaccurate with regard to their own – is consistent with the idea that people saw their 
own post-manipulation attitudes as more exogenous than others' attitudes (see also Douglas & 
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Sutton, 2010).  Notwithstanding, these results are subject to alternative explanations that have 
little to do with exogeneity (see Chapter 3), and it should be noted that other results from the 
third-person literature often tell a slightly different story, with people underestimating the effect 
of information on themselves, but overestimating the effect of information on others (for 
reviews, see Perloff, 1993, 1999).  
In total, the psychology and communications literature suggest that people understand the 
source of choices and decisions differently for self and other.  Returning to Figure 1, people 
perceive direct influences of social-situational factors upon others' choices and decisions, but 
may see only indirect connections between these same forces and their own choices.  In Chapter 
3, I develop a paradigm for testing this idea, which borrows from both the psychology and 
communications literature.  Two studies allow for a test of just how much exogeneity people see 
in their own decisions, relative to the decisions of another person, and whether the amount of 
exogeneity seen in the self overstates the extent to which decisions are actually free from 
extraneous influence.
Sources of asymmetric perceptions of exogeneity
Another open question is how it is that people arrive at the belief that their own decisions 
are both freer than those of other people and freer than they actually are.  Not surprisingly, both 
bodies of literature reviewed above offer plausible explanations.  I build upon these explanations 
in Chapter 4 in an attempt to understand how the meta-cognitive features of decision-making 
paint one's own decisions as more exogenous than those of a peer.
One reason people may report more freedom in their own decisions than those of a peer is 
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that conformity to an external pressure is viewed negatively, and people are motivated to think 
well of themselves (Perloff, 1989, 1993, 1999).  On this theorizing, most commonly offered in 
the third-person effect literature, people should perceive less conformity in the self than others 
when issues are important (and thus, self-relevant) and should demonstrate the effect simply as a 
by-product of the desire to enhance positive feelings about the self.  Very little empirical work 
has been put forth in support of these ideas, although it seems likely that, particularly within 
cultural contexts where disjoint models of agency are emphasized, the pressure to see oneself 
more than others as a cultural exemplar will drive asymmetric perceptions of susceptibility to 
social influence.  This explanation, however, proves somewhat unsatisfying in that it makes no 
specific claims about how exactly such asymmetric beliefs are supported.
Another possibility, proposed by Pronin and colleagues (Pronin, 2009; Pronin & Kugler, 
2007, 2010; Pronin et al., 2007), offers a social-cognitive route by which these beliefs might be 
maintained.  This proposal states that people privilege different information when assessing bias 
and conformity in themselves and others.  Specifically, people look to outward behavior to 
understand when others are influenced by social-situational factors, but rely upon introspective 
information when assessing bias in themselves.  Across a number of studies (most notably, 
Pronin & Kugler, 2007 and Pronin et al., 2007), participants reported using different information 
when engaged in these evaluations of self and other.  
In one study, for example (Pronin et al., 2007), participants perceived less political party 
influence in their own conforming attitudes than those of a peer.  They further indicated that they 
looked to their thoughts and introspections for evidence of their own conformity (and finding 
none, concluded that they had not conformed), but relied less upon this information when 
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assessing conformity in others.  The lack of reliance on others' introspections was not driven by 
availability of this information – even when provided with a transcript of the information that 
had passed through their peer's head as he or she was forming a final attitude, participants 
discounted the information as diagnostic of conformity.  
Another possibility, tested in Chapter 4, falls out of the model illustrated in Figure 1. 
This hypothesis begins with the proposal that, in at least some cases, people will assess 
exogeneity by “trying on” their own or another person's thoughts at the time of the decision.  In 
other words, people will simulate what they, or another person, would be thinking as they arrive 
at a decision.  If the phenomenology of these simulations is different for self and other, it seems 
likely that this experience will yield very different perceptions of exogeneity.  In particular, 
people may experience others as starting from a more biased decision point than they themselves 
do, and as progressing more quickly through their decision than does the self.  Compared with 
simulations of the self's decision making, simulations of others will provide minimal evidence of 
deliberation or exogenous intervention, and so, people will see others' decision as more foregone 
conclusions than their own, beginning from the point where an extraneous bias was introduced.
There is some anecdotal evidence that people overestimate just how much of a causal role 
extended deliberation plays in their own choices.  Although never formally tested, Griffin and 
Tversky (1992) asked job candidates to rank order the job positions they were considering from 
most desirable to least desirable, and then asked the candidates to assess the likelihood that they 
would, in the end, choose the most desirable job.  Although people overwhelmingly chose the job 
that topped their list, they only saw themselves as 65% likely to do so at the time they were 
queried by the authors.  Thus, they were unaware of just how made up their minds really were. 
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This phenomenology (the sense that one's decision is far from made and that one's mind could be 
shifted at any point), I argue, is ever-present in people's own decision-making, but considerably 
less prominent when people “try on” others' decisions.  Chapter 4 explores the way in which this 
asymmetric experience of indecision contributes to the sense that one's final decision was freer 
from influence than was the decision of a peer.
Overview of the guiding questions
In its particulars, then, the research reported herein attempts to provide answers to four 
questions: 
(1) Do people conceive of their decisions, relative to those made by others, more as acts 
of exogenous agency?  That is, do they see themselves as engaging in more active choice than 
others do when arriving at decisions?  
(2) When compared to reality, do people overestimate just how exogenous their decisions 
are?  Are they more accurate in estimating the impact of extraneous influences on their peers' 
decisions than on their own? 
(3) How do people simulate the decisions that others make?  In what way is simulating 
another person's decision-making phenomenologically (i.e., meta-cognitively) distinct from 
simulating one's own decision-making or making an actual decision?  
And, finally, (4) might people see their decisions as more exogenous than other people's 
because of fundamental differences in the way people simulate their own and other people's 
decisions? 
15
Chapter 2
The self as an exogenous agent:  
The role of choice in everyday behaviors performed by self and other
The goal of the first two studies was to document self/other differences in the perception 
of exogenous agency.  To say that people see more exogenous agency in their own decisions than 
another person's decisions is to say that people see themselves more than others as active authors 
of their own lives.  This means that instances of behavior that may appear, from an outside 
perspective, to be minimally agentic either because they seem to require very little active choice 
or because they appear to conform to some kind of endogenous (social-situational) influence, 
would, from the perspective of the agent, still seem like an act of exogenous agency. 
In Study 1, people were asked to compare the amount of active choice that goes into their 
daily decisions to the amount of active choice that their peers put into the same decisions.  I 
hypothesized that, on average, people would see themselves relative to others as more active 
choosers in their day-to-day lives.  
The second study built off of existing work in the conformity literature (Pronin et al., 
2007), by asking participants to consider a range of conformity behaviors from either their own 
perspective or from the perspective of a randomly-selected peer.  I expected these instances of 
conformity to be construed differently for self and other, such that conformity on the part of the 
self would nonetheless be construed as an exogenous act of choice (I chose to conform), whereas 
conformity on the part of another person would be construed endogenously (He just went along).
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Together, these two studies provide a basis for understanding a fundamental dimension 
(exogenous agency) upon which self and other are viewed distinctly.
Study 1:  Active choice for self and other
How do people see the decisions they and others make on a day-to-day basis?  Note that 
many daily decisions – what clothes to wear, what cereal to eat for breakfast – can occur 
relatively seamlessly and often require minimal deliberation or active choice.  Notwithstanding, 
even these often effortless decision chores may be occasionally tinged with a person's agentic 
signature.  A small deliberation here, a consideration of alternatives there, might serve to imbue 
these otherwise casual decisions with the feeling that one has engaged in active choice about the 
direction of his or her life.  Study 1 explored whether routine decisions such as these would 
nonetheless be conceived of as acts of exogenous agency more for self than for others.
In this study, I used the concept of active versus passive choice as a metric of perceived 
exogeneity.  In talking about active choice, I am borrowing from the cultural literature on disjoint 
versus conjoint models of agency (a distinction I have argued is more or less isomorphic with the 
way I am using the concepts of exogenous and endogenous agency).  As it turns out, the 
relationship between agency and choice is very different depending upon whether one comes 
from a culture that employs a disjoint or conjoint model of agency.  Savani and colleagues 
(Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010) have shown that people from cultures that 
feature disjoint models of agency (such as the U.S.) place more emphasis on decision-maker's 
choices, and see agency itself as the capacity to actively shape one's life vis-a-vis independent, or 
free, choices.  Individuals from cultures employing conjoint models of agency (such as India), in 
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contrast, de-emphasize the concept of choice in their models of agency and action; focusing 
instead on the situational forces or social roles that drive a person's decisions and behavior.
I sought to import these findings from the cultural literature into an exploration of 
exogenous agency for self and other in Study 1.  To do so, I asked participants to make explicit 
comparisons between their own daily decisions and those of the average peer (another Cornell 
student) with respect to the amount of active choice involved in arriving at their decision.  I 
anticipated, in accordance with the hypothesis that people see their own decisions as more 
exogenous than the average person's, that participants would ascribe more active choice to their 
everyday decisions than to their peers' decisions.
Method
Participants
Fifty-five Cornell undergraduates completed this questionnaire at the end of an unrelated 
lab session.  For their participation, participants received either course credit or $5.
Materials and Procedures
Participants were informed that they would be considering a series of everyday behaviors 
and decisions, and rating them in terms of the amount of choice that goes into each.  They read 
the following description, which explained the concept of active vs. passive choice:
Decisions arise from choices that fall on a continuum from active (those that involve 
effort and conscious deliberation) to passive (those that occur somewhat seamlessly, 
without much thought).  When we give attention and consideration to a decision, that is 
an active choice; when we make decisions without much effort, habitually, or simply 
because we're going along with other people or a norm, that is a passive choice.
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Participants were then asked to consider 14 behaviors (see Table 1).  For each behavior they were 
asked to think back to how they had gone about making the decision yesterday.  They then 
answered the following question:  “Relative to the average Cornell student (not you) was the 
choice you made more passive or more active?”  They offered each response on a scale from -2 
(Much more passive than the average Cornell student) to 2 (Much more active than the average 
Cornell student).  The midpoint of the scale was labeled Just as active/passive as the average 
Cornell student, and the -1 and 1 points were labeled as Somewhat more [passive/active] as the  
average Cornell student, respectively.
Results and Discussion
Mean responding is presented in Table 1.  Values higher than zero indicate that 
participants saw their decision, relative to that of the average student, as a product of more active 
choice.  On 11 out of 14 scenarios, the mean choice rating was positive, suggesting that 
participants saw their daily routine as governed by more active choice than the daily routine of 
their average peer.  I created a composite score by averaging participants' responses across all 14 
items; this overall mean (M = .14, SD = .35) was significantly greater than zero, t(54) = 2.89, p = 
.005.  Thus, participants saw more exogeneity in  their own daily decisions than the decisions of 
their peers.
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Table 1: Participants' mean ratings (and standard deviations) of the amount of passive versus 
active choice involved in 14 daily decisions, Study 1.  Numbers higher than zero indicate that 
participants saw their decision as the product of more active choice, relative to the decision of 
another Cornell student.
Behavior Mean choice rating (SD)
What time to get out of bed in the morning .16 (1.16)
What to have for breakfast .05 (1.12)
What clothes to wear .11 (1.16)
Whether to attend class or skip .25 (1.18)
When to work on homework and for how long .28 (1.10)
What to have for lunch .25 (.97)
Whether to watch TV/What to watch on TV -.13 (1.22)
When to check email .03 (1.15)
Whether/when to go on Facebook -.23 (1.04)
What to have for dinner .35 (1.09)
Whether to stay in at night or go out .16 (1.10)
When to go to bed .28 (1.11)
Whether to shower before bed -.07 (1.03)
Whether to set an alarm for the next morning (and what 
time to set it for)
.40 (1.18)
Study 1 paints a picture of the self as an exogenous agent whose decisions seemingly 
emerge from more active consideration than those of the average person.  Nonetheless, there are 
several limitations.  First, because the design asked participants to reflect upon the decisions they 
made yesterday (which were, of course, idiosyncratic to the participants themselves), there is no 
telling whether the decisions participants made actually were the products of more active choice 
than the same decisions made by peers.  Second, because the responses participants gave were 
comparative in nature (i.e., “relative to the average Cornell student”), it is not clear whether 
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those responses reflect, in an absolute sense, greater perceived exogeneity in the self or greater 
perceived endogeneity in other people.
Both of these limitations were addressed in Study 2 and throughout the remainder of the 
paper. In Study 2, I asked participants to consider hypothetical events, which allowed me to 
control for the behaviors that participants were considering.  Participants also rated either their 
own behavior or that of a peer, which allowed me to disentangle beliefs about exogeneity for the 
self from beliefs about endogeneity of other people.
Study 2:  Exogenous construal of conformity behavior for self and other
Study 2 explored exogeneity in a more indirect way than Study 1, by assessing the extent 
to which people construe their own or their peers' acts of conformity in exogenous terms.  This 
study was modeled off of the conformity findings of Pronin and colleagues (Pronin et al., 2007). 
In these studies, the researchers asked participants to consider an instance of conformity from 
their own lives (such as purchasing a “fad” product or aligning one's private views with those of 
a group) and to assess the degree to which their own or another person's behavior in this situation 
was the product of social influence.  Across studies, participants reported that their own decisions 
were less influenced by these pressures than others' were.  What remains ambiguous in these 
studies, however, is how exactly participants registered these acts of conformity for self and 
other.  Although participants said that others were more influenced than they were, this could 
reflect anything from a belief in the total absence social influence for the self to a belief in the 
blind obedience of other people.  
Study 2 helps to clarify this issue in two ways.  First, the guiding hypothesis of Study 2 
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was that the very same act of conformity would be construed as different behavior, depending on 
whether it was viewed from the perspective of self or other.  Conformity on the part of the self 
would be construed as an exogenous act – one in which the person decides to align their behavior 
with a particular external pressure.  Conformity on the part of another person, though, would be 
construed as an endogenous act, one in which extraneous forces shape behavior with minimal 
reference to the agent's choice.  In addition, participants in Study 2 rated either their own or 
another person's conformity in a manner that did not confound beliefs about self and other with 
beliefs about people in general, allowing the results to speak to more than just comparative 
estimates of a single instance of conformity against a more general tendency toward conformity 
in the population.
Participants in Study 2 considered a series of scenarios (for a copy of the materials, see 
the Appendix) in which their own or another person's behavior conformed to an extraneous 
influence (such as a norm, a trend, or another person's suggestion).  For each scenario, 
participants picked which of two descriptions better captured the behavior.  One description used 
an endogenous construal of the behavior (one that emphasized the agent's blind adherence to the 
extraneous force); the other description provided an exogenous construal of the behavior 
(typically a decision to conform one's behavior to the extraneous influence).  
The exogenous construals were written in such a way that there was always some 
indication that the agent him- or herself had played an active role in bringing about the behavior. 
For example, one scenario (“Voting decision”) was a case in which the protagonist felt he or she 
did not have enough information about a local election and, so, sought the advice of the 
neighbors, and eventually voted with the neighbors' suggestion.  The endogenous construal (My 
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neighbors told me who to vote for) lacks reference to any intervening choice on the part of the 
agent, emphasizing the direct effect of the extraneous influence on the agent's behavior.  The 
exogenous construal (I listened to their advice), by comparison, connotes that, at some stage, the 
agent consented to being influenced by the neighbor's opinion.  Thus, the exogenous construal 
situates the cause of the voting decision not in the neighbor (or the advice), but in the agent's 
decision to follow the neighbor's advice.
I predicted that people would on average see their own behaviors as possessing more of 
an exogenous signature – that is, they would pick more exogenous construal of their own 
conforming behavior than the conforming behavior of a peer.
Method
Participants
Eighty-six participants (assigned randomly to either the self or peer condition) were 
recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk.  They completed this scenario and one unrelated 
survey in exchange for $0.20.
Materials and Procedures
Participants were told that they were taking part in a study about how people describe 
behavior.  They read that any behavior can be construed in a variety of ways.  For example, 
shoveling the sidewalk outside your house after it snows could be described as "helping out my 
neighborhood," "keeping the sidewalk safe," or in some places, "avoiding a fine."  Participants 
were informed that none of these descriptions is any more accurate than the others, but that they 
represent different ways of seeing the same action.
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Participants then read each of the 10 instances of conformity in randomized order.  In 
each, the protagonist was either the participant (self condition) or an average person, to whom I 
gave the name “Mike” (other condition), varied entirely between-subjects.  After reading the 
scenario, participants were given two possible ways of construing the behavior (one exogenous, 
one endogenous) and were asked to indicate which of the two options was the better descriptor 
for the behavior.  Participants indicated how well each description “fit” the behavior using a 
continuous scale, with options Definitely #1, Somewhat #1, Somewhat #2, and Definitely #2.
Results
Before analyzing data, I reverse scored 4 of the 10 responses, so that higher numbers on 
each scenario indicated greater preference for the exogenous construal.  These converted means 
and standard deviations are presented in Table 2.  On nine of the 10 scenarios, ratings of 
participants in the self condition were higher than ratings for participants in the other condition. 
Summing across all ten scenarios, the total for those in the self condition (M = 26.39, SD = 4.92) 
was significantly higher than the total for those in the other condition (M = 23.65, SD = 3.22), 
t(82) = 3.00, p = .004, and this overall pattern suggested that people preferred more exogenous 
construal of their own conformity than others' conformity.
In a secondary analysis, I recoded participants' data into a dichotomous responses, 
according to whether they construed each of the ten instances of conformity exogenously (coded 
1) or endogenously (coded 0).  Totaling these values revealed that, on average, participants 
picked more exogenous construals for their own behavior (M = 5.37, SD = 2.09) than for another 
person's behavior (M = 4.47, SD = 1.61), t(82) = 2.21, p = .03.  It is interesting to note that both 
ways of cleaving the data situate self and other on opposite sides of the (hypothetical) midpoint 
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response.  On average, participants' construal for others fell on the endogenous end of the 
response scale; while their construal for the self fell on the exogenous end of the scale.
It is also notable that in at least three of these scenarios (whistle-blowing, stingy tipping, 
and jaywalking) the conforming behavior was mildly negative.  If participants were being self-
serving in their attributions, they would say that when they failed to speak out against someone 
who was cutting in line, or when they chose to short change a server in a restaurant, these 
behaviors were attributable to forces of the situation or peer pressure, not to exogenous decisions 
that they had made.  However, responses for these scenarios look identical to responses on the 
other items, suggesting that participants tended to see exogeneity everywhere when looking at 
their own behavior, relative to others'.
Table 2: Participants' ratings for endogenous versus exogenous constural of conformity behavior, 
Study 2.  Higher numbers represent a preference for more exogenous construal of conformity.
Scenario Mean (SD) for  
other rating
Mean (SD) 
for self  
rating
Self-rating 
minus other-
rating
Television program 2.12 (.96) 2.60 (.99) .48
Voting decision 2.16 (1.07) 2.83 (.96) .67
Camera purchase 2.42 (1.00) 2.45 (.99) .03
Whistle-blowing 2.72 (.85) 3.26 (.94) .54
“Green” practice 3.07 (.86) 3.17 (.92) .10
Money donation 1.88 (.91) 2.44 (.98) .56
Stingy tipping 1.86 (.86) 2.12 (1.14) .26
Going out 2.53 (1.05) 2.66 (.99) .13
Jaywalking 1.98 (1.08) 2.56 (1.10) .58
Entree selection 2.91 (1.04) 2.24 (.93) -.33
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Discussion
The results from Studies 1 and 2 suggest that people see the workings of exogenous 
agency more when looking at their own lives than the lives of their peers.  A student sample in 
Study 1 indicated that, on average, more active choice was involved in the decisions they make 
throughout their day than in the decisions their peers make.  An internet sample in Study 2 
indicated that conformity on the part of the self meant something different than conformity on 
the part of another person.  In particular, those in Study 2 construed conformity on the part of the 
self more in terms of their decision to align behavior with an extraneous pressure, and 
conformity on the part of others as evidence of a direct social-situational influence on behavior.
Choices as mediators between environmental inputs and behavioral outputs.  One 
way of conceiving of exogenous agency, captured by the data from Studies 1 and 2, relies upon 
the statistical concept of mediation.  In mediation, the effect of an input variable on an output 
variable is carried through some proximate third variable.  In the case of exogenous agency, that 
third variable is choice.  
According to the results of Study 1, the role of active choice on decisions and behavior is 
emphasized when people think of their own decisions, relative to decisions made by others.  As a 
result, people see a more direct effect of social-psychological influences upon others' behavior 
than their own.  The results of Study 2 show this most clearly, with participants choosing, for 
themselves, construals of conformity that highlight the mediating role of choice in the decision to 
conform one's behavior to an external norm.
Because choice is very much at the forefront of people's minds when thinking about their 
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own decisions, they are likely to “miss” the direct or indirect effects of social-psychological 
variables upon their own decisions.  These variables will be eclipsed by the overwhelming role 
that choice plays in people's understanding of their own decisions, and in looking back, choice, 
as a proximal link between the external world and the person's ultimate decision, will loom large 
as the key determinant of the person's own decision. On the other hand, because choice is de-
emphasized in people's understanding of others' decisions, the direct effects of extraneous 
variables should be more front-and-center and better understood in people's models of their 
peers.  
On the basis of this reasoning, Chapter 3 (and, later, Chapter 4) sought to test the 
accuracy of people's understanding of how influenced they are, and how influenced their peers 
are, by extraneous influences.  Does the exogenous model of agency that people apply to their 
own decision-making accurately reflect the constraints that extraneous forces place on decisions 
and behavior, or does it underestimate just how influenced people actually are by external 
forces?  Do people show greater wisdom about the effect of these same forces on their peers' 
thinking?  These questions formed the bases for Studies 3A and 3B.  
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Chapter 3
Perceptions of exogeneity for self and other:  Is the self really more exogenous?
The studies in Chapter 3 (along with those in Chapter 4) explore self/other differences in 
presumed exogeneity by asking people to anticipate the effect of extraneous influences on 
decisions made by the self or another person.  I expected that people would see their own 
decisions as more impervious to extraneous influence than others' decisions.  Advancing beyond 
this directional effect, however, I took the additional step of testing the accuracy of these beliefs. 
In particular, I compared participants' estimates of their own or another person's decision 
exogeneity to the actual effects of an extraneous influence on decision-making.  This comparison 
allowed for a better understanding of whether self/other differences in presumed exogeneity 
reflect an underestimation of the self's susceptibility to influence, an overestimation of others' 
susceptibility, or both.
In terms of accuracy, past work suggests a clear prediction with regard to people's beliefs 
about their own susceptibility to influence, but competing hypotheses with regard to their beliefs 
about others.  People seem not to register the extent to which their thoughts and behaviors are 
affected by a variety of factors (Balcetis & Dunning, in press; Pronin & Kugler, 2007), which 
suggests that estimates of one's own decision exogeneity should be similarly flawed.  People 
should systematically overestimate the extent to which their own decisions are free from 
extraneous influence.
With regard to the perceived exogeneity of others, though, the prediction is less clear. 
Some research (Balcetis & Dunning, in press; Douglas & Sutton, 2008, 2010;  Epley & Dunning, 
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2000) suggests that people should be fairly accurate with regard to the impact of various 
extraneous forces on their peers' behaviors and decisions.  Other research (Gunther, 1991; 
Perloff, 1989), however, suggests that people may overestimate the extent to which others' 
decisions and views are pushed around by extraneous forces.
Research findings from the third-person effect literature offer the most relevant tests of 
accuracy with regard to self/other differences in susceptibility to influence.  In one series of 
studies, for example, Douglas and Sutton (2010) assessed participants' views on a particular issue 
(e.g., gun control or fossil fuel use) as a baseline (Time 1) measure of their attitudes.  A week 
later, participants returned to the lab and were provided arguments that supported one side of the 
relevant issue.  After reading the persuasive arguments, participants once again reported their 
(Time 2) attitudes on the issue.  From this, researchers could calculate the actual effect of the 
message on participants' attitudes.  Then, participants made three additional estimates.  First, 
they were asked to recall what their attitudes were a week prior – before they had read the 
persuasive message.  Next, they were asked to estimate the effect of the persuasive message on 
another person by estimating the pre- and post- message attitudes of the average person.
It turned out that people's estimates of their own attitude change from Time 1 to Time 2 
were significantly more modest than both the amount of change prompted by the persuasive 
message (i.e., the actual change in their attitudes) and the amount of change they predicted would 
occur in their peers.  Notwithstanding, participants' estimates of their peers' attitude change 
roughly approximated the actual shift in attitudes from Time 1 to Time 2. Thus, Douglas and 
Sutton (2010) argued that people underestimate their own susceptibility to influence, while 
maintaining accuracy with regard to the effect of a persuasive message on others.  It should be 
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noted that other, similar lines of research have provided more of a mixed-bag of results with 
regard to self/other accuracy and the third-person effect (for a review, see Perloff, 1999).
While the Douglas and Sutton results potentially speak to the question of accuracy in 
people's beliefs about their own and other people's decision exogeneity, they leave open an 
alternative explanation, and one that has nothing to do with presumed exogeneity.  The 
alternative explanation, drawing from Self-Perception Theory is that participants are unable to 
recall their attitudes at Time 1, and therefore use their current attitudes to reconstruct attitudes of 
the past (Bem, 1967; Bem & McConnell, 1970).  Indeed, the methods employed in the third-
person effect literature as well as the results obtained bear striking resemblance to those from 
Bem and McConnell's classic (1970) studies.  However, Bem and McConnell were not arguing 
that participants denied change in their own attitudes, but rather that they could not perceive 
change because there never was a stable Time 1 attitude to begin with.
From this perspective, the resemblance between attitudes at Time 1 and Time 2 in third-
person effect studies may not reflect a belief that one's own attitudes are impervious to influence 
(the exogeneity hypothesis); it could instead be symptomatic of the reconstructive nature of 
memory, and participants' inability to undo current knowledge when attempting to recall attitudes 
of the past.  Given that the typical third-person effect manipulation shifts participants' attitudes 
by less than 10% of the initially-reported attitude (see, for example, Douglas & Sutton, 2008; 
2010), it seems entirely plausible that participants are simply unable to recall where they started 
from prior to reading the persuasive message, and therefore use current attitudes as a guide.
It should be noted that this alternative account is not at all damning for the overall 
message of the third-person effect literature.  Regardless of the mechanism, it is still the case that 
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participants remain largely unaware of media influences upon their own attitudes, and intuit with 
some degree of precision the effect of these messages on others.  However, the exogeneity 
hypothesis advanced in this paper is more specific with regard to perceptions of influence for self 
and other.  It is not merely that people fail to register changes in their attitudes and beliefs, but 
that they deny that extraneous influences have as much of an effect on their own decisions as 
they do on others'.
Studies 3A and 3B:  Differential accuracy of self/other exogeneity
With this in mind, Studies 3A and 3B borrowed from both the conformity and the third-
person effect literature to assess whether, as an index of presumed exogeneity, people deny 
extraneous influences on their own decisions while remaining aware of the influence of these 
same forces on others.  In both studies, I first presented one group of participants (decision-
makers) with a controversial social issue, told them about the attitudes of their peers, and then 
asked them to form their own attitude about what should be done.  This allowed for an estimate 
of exactly how much impact the attitudes of a person's peers had on the person's own decisions 
and attitudes.  I then asked another group of participants (forecasters) to estimate the impact that 
peers' attitudes would have on their own or another person's attitudes on the same issues.  
By using the same dependent measures for both halves of the studies, I could compare 
perceived exogeneity of decisions for self and other (gleaned from forecasters) to the actual 
exogeneity of the decision-makers' decisions.  By employing separate groups of participants, I 
could ensure that forecasters' responses reflected the anticipated effect of the extraneous 
influence (in this case, peer influence) for self and other, avoiding alternative explanations 
stemming from flaws associated with retrospective reports of past attitudes.
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Method
Participants
Both studies 3A and 3B employed one group of decision-makers and one group of 
forecasters.  Decision-makers were subjected to the attitudes of their peers before being 
prompted to make their own decision about a controversial issue.  Forecasters simulated the 
decision that they or another person would make after being exposed to the same information 
about the attitudes of their peers and then simulated the decision as if they had been exposed to 
different information about their peers' attitudes.
In Study 3A Cornell undergraduates participated in exchange for course credit (the survey 
was administered at the end of an unrelated experimental session).  Study 3B used a sample 
recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk; participants were compensated $0.05 for their time. 
Participants in both studies were randomly assigned to be decision-makers or forecasters.  Across 
the two studies, 98 people served as decision-makers and 80 people served as forecasters.  
Materials and Procedures
Decision-makers.  Decision-makers in Study 3A read that there was widespread 
controversy regarding Facebook's current privacy settings.  Participants were randomly assigned 
to learn that a majority of their peers approved or disapproved of current privacy settings.  Half 
were told that in a recent survey 30% of Cornell students expressed dissatisfaction with the 
current degree of privacy granted to them by Facebook; the other half were told that 70% of their 
peers were dissatisfied.
Decision-makers in Study 3B read about a (true) recent controversy regarding the use of 
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the n-word in Huck Finn.  They read that publishers had recently started producing edited 
versions of Finn that omitted or replaced all reference to the taboo word, much to the 
dissatisfaction of educators.4  They were further told about a recent educational proposal, which 
would retain the unedited version of Finn in the school curriculum, but change the age at which 
students would read the original version (delaying it from 6th to 8th grade).  This later exposure to 
Finn would ostensibly allow for more mature discussions of the historical and sociological 
implications of the text.  Decision-makers were told that in a recent poll of Americans 82% 
approved or disapproved (manipulated between-subjects) of this proposal.
In both Studies 3A and 3B, decision-makers offered their own opinion about the issue 
after reading the above descriptions.  They indicated their approval of Facebook's privacy 
settings (Study 3A) or their approval of the educational proposal (Study 3B) using Likert scales, 
with higher numbers signifying greater approval.  In Study 3A, approval was measured on a 1-7 
Likert scale; in Study 2B, a 1-5 Likert scale.
Forecasters.  Forecasters were randomly assigned to simulate making a decision either 
from their own perspective or from the perspective of a randomly selected peer from the Cornell 
(Study 3A) or M-Turk subject pool (Study 3B).  They were introduced to either the Facebook or 
Huck Finn controversy, and were asked to imagine that they [their peer] had been told that a 
majority of respondents had indicated approval or disapproval toward the issue at hand.  I used 
the exact proportions and exact wording for forecasters as I did for decision-makers.  They then 
were asked to anticipate the extent to which they [their peer] would indicate approval of the 
issue.  
4 In this, educators' views matched those of participants.  Across decision-makers and forecasters in Study 2B, the 
mean approval rating for the decision to publish the censored version of Huck Finn was 1.85, on a scale 
anchored from 1 (Strongly disapprove) to 7 (Strongly approve)
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After they made their ratings, forecasters were asked to imagine that they [the same peer] 
had been in the opposite condition – in other words, if forecasters had just imagined that they 
[their peer] had been in the majority approves condition, they were now asked to imagine that, in 
fact, they had been in the majority disapproves condition.  They were asked to indicate what their 
[their peer's] response would have been had they [their peer] instead been given this alternative 
information, using the same scale.  The order of information was counterbalanced so that half of 
the participants first imagined majority approval and half first imagined majority disapproval.
Results
Results are summarized in Table 3.  I first examined the impact that the majority had on 
decision-makers' own attitudes.  In both Study 3A and Study 3B, decision-makers' attitudes 
toward the two controversial issues were significantly swayed toward the majority opinion.  In 
Study 3A, decision-makers approved more of Facebook's current privacy settings when the 
majority of their peers approved than when the majority of their peers disapproved, t(38) = 2.32, 
p < .05.  In Study 3B, decision-makers approved more of the educational proposal when the 
majority of Americans approved than when the majority disapproved, t(56) = 2.98, p < .01. 
Thus, whether or not they acknowledged it, decision-makers were influenced by majority 
opinion when arriving at their own decision.
To what extent did forecasters have prospective awareness of the effects of the majority 
on their own or another person's attitudes?  Recall that forecasters offered two ratings.  They 
began by estimating the degree to which they [their peer] would express approval of the issue, 
given information about the majority of respondents (either that the majority approved or 
disapproved of the issue).  They then were asked to imagine that they [the same peer] had 
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instead been given the opposite information about the attitudes of the majority of respondents, 
and estimated the response that they [their peer] would have given had they been led to believe 
this opposing information.  By subtracting forecasters' second approval rating from the first, and 
taking the absolute value of this difference score, I estimated the effect that forecasters thought 
majority opinion would have on their own or their peers' decision-making.5
In both Studies 3A and 3B, forecasters estimated that majority opinion would have a 
larger effect on shaping the attitudes of peers than the attitudes of the self, t(42) = 5.75, p < .0001 
and t(30) = 3.83, p < .01, for Studies 3A and 3B, respectively.  To explore the accuracy of these 
estimates, I collapsed across the results of both studies.  A look at Table 3 suggests that although 
forecasters estimated that peers' decisions would be more influenced by the majority than the 
self's decisions, the estimates they gave for self and peer seemed to fall on either side of the 
observed amount of influence evident in decision-makers' responses.  Indeed, when meta-
analyzing across studies, forecasters significantly underestimated the effect of the majority upon 
their own decisions, Z = -9.80, p < .0001, but significantly overestimated the effect of the 
majority upon their peers' decisions, Z = 3.56, p < .001.  Thus, forecasters assumed too much 
exogeneity for themselves and too little exogeneity for other people.  Note, however, that on 
average, people's estimates of others' exogeneity were were off the mark by a lesser degree than 
were estimates for the self.  A comparison of the above Z-scores suggests that people's 
underestimation their own susceptibility to influence was almost three times greater than their 
overestimation of others' susceptibility to influence. 
5 In Study 3A, six forecasters estimated a “contrarian effect” of the information, saying that if they [their peer] had 
been told that the majority of Cornell students were satisfied, as opposed to dissatisfied, with Facebook's privacy 
settings, their own [their peers] estimates would have shifted toward greater dissatisfaction.  In these analyses, I 
have excluded these participants because it is unclear what such a response means with regard to the hypothesis 
under investigation.  
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Table 3: Actual and forecasted effects of majority opinion on the decisions of self and other, 
Studies 3A and 3B.
Actual effect of majority 
opinion on decision-makers' 
attitudes
Forecasted effect of majority  
opinion on attitudes of 
self and other
Majority 
approves
Majority 
disapproves
Effect of 
majority opinion Self Other
Study 3A 
(Facebook 
privacy)
4.65 (1.57) 3.55 (1.43) 1.10* .42 (.65) 1.80 (.89)
Study 3B 
(Huck Finn 
proposal)
4.25 (.84) 3.43 (1.22) .82** .12 (.34) 1.25 (1.13)
Discussion
The results from Studies 3A and 3B confirm that people see themselves as less 
susceptible to social influence than others.  Relative to others, people see their own decisions as 
arising independently of extraneous influences.  People anticipated that the average person 
would shift his or her stance on a controversial issue, in accordance with the views of a majority. 
By comparison, people believed their own stance would be more invariant to these shifts in 
social context.
Responses elicited from forecasters in these studies provide an unclouded view of the 
extent to which decisions on the part of self and other are seen as exogenous.  By asking 
forecasters to consider their own responses or the responses of their peers in one social context 
(majority approval) and then to consider what those responses would be in the alternative social 
context (minority approval), I obtained a measure of susceptibility to extraneous influence that is 
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unconfounded with time, memory, or effects due to having made an actual decision on the issue. 
The results were telling:  In Study 3A, forecasters anticipated that the effect of social influence 
would be four times stronger for other people than for themselves; and in Study 3B, the 
perceived influence was ten times greater for others than for the self.
When I compared these estimates with the actual effect of majority opinion on decision-
makers, the results were similarly straightforward.  Forecasters predicted that their own decisions 
would be more exogenous, and that others' decisions would be less exogenous, than they actually 
were.  These results replicate in a single study findings from other research programs showing 
either overestimation of peers' susceptibility to influence (Gunther, 1991; Perloff, 1989) or 
underestimation of one's own susceptibility to influence (Cohen, Mutz, Price, & Gunther, 1988), 
but diverge from the findings reviewed above provided by Douglas and Sutton (2008, 2010).  I 
will return to this divergence in the General Discussion, after reporting the results of Study 5.
Interim summary
Studies 1, 2, 3A, and 3B provide a rich picture of self/other differences in perceived 
decision exogeneity.  Relative to their peers, people see themselves as engaging in more active 
choice throughout their day; they also construe their outward acts of conformity, relative to those 
of their peers, as behavioral choices rather than mindless obedience.  Studies 3A and 3B further 
fleshes out this self/other asymmetry in perceived exogeneity.  People see their own decisions as 
relatively more invariant to features of their social context than are the decisions of other people 
– and they considerably underestimate just how influenced they are by social pressures. 
The question that remains is, why do people perceive their decisions as more exogenous 
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than their peers' decisions, and, indeed, as more exogenous than they actually are?  Chapter 4 
explores this issue.
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Chapter 4
Moving to mechanism:  What gives rise to the sense that decisions are exogenous?
What gives rise to the illusion that one's own decisions are more exogenous than others'? 
There are likely many factors that contribute.  Pronin and colleagues (Pronin, 2008; Pronin et al., 
2007; Pronin & Kugler, 2007, 2010) have argued that self/other differences in perception of bias, 
conformity, and free will can be traced back to differential emphasis upon introspective versus 
behavioral information for self and other, respectively.  On this account, people examine their 
own introspections when determining whether they are biased, have conformed, or possess free 
will.  In assessing others on these same dimensions, however, people rely less upon introspective 
information (even when a transcript of another person's thoughts is provided to them) and instead 
look to others' behavior for evidence.  Thus, the very same behavior may be seen as unbiased or 
biased for self and other, respectively, because people use different information for their 
assessments.  Although bias may be apparent in a person's behavior, the person herself will not 
register it as biased unless the contents of her introspections suggest biased thinking.
In Chapter 4, I take a different approach to understanding self/other differences in 
perceived exogeneity.  Contrary to Pronin, I hypothesize that people can go beyond observable 
behavior when attempting to understand others' exogeneity.  In particular, when assessing 
whether they or someone else was influenced, people may “try on” the decision-making that they 
or another person engaged in when arriving at their conclusion.  I propose that simulations of 
decision-making for the self versus another person “feel” different – that is, the meta-cognitive 
components of these simulations are distinct – and that this difference in meta-cognitive 
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experience leads to differing conclusions about the extent to which self and other are engaged in 
free, or exogenous, choice.
I focus primarily upon the meta-cognitive experience of indecision, or perceived distance 
from a final decision.  Griffin and Tversky (1992) reported the results of an informal polling of 
their peers that illustrates this phenomenon.  They approached 24 colleagues who were 
considering a variety of job prospects and asked them for the likelihood that they would select 
each job that they were considering.  On average, people reported that they were 65% likely to 
choose the top job on their list.  In actuality, the decision-makers chose that job 96% of the time. 
Thus, although people's job choices were somewhat “fated” (with a certainty of 96%), decision-
makers perceived themselves as farther away from a decision than they actually were – in their 
minds, there was still a good chance (35%) that they might go with another option.
This underestimation of decision progress may give rise to the feeling that one's decisions 
were made exogenously.  People may underestimate the effect of extraneous influences on their 
own decisions because, even when such an influence is present, they fail to recognize how much 
those extraneous factors have entrenched their decision.  Thus, it may feel as though the decision 
could still go either way.  On the other hand, people may estimate a stronger effect of extraneous 
influences on their peers, seeing initial biases in decision-making as having sealed the fate of 
another person's decision.  The next two studies sought to test (a) whether people, in fact, 
perceive their own decision progress as slower than the progress of a known peer (Study 4) and 
(b) whether self/other differences in decision progress serve as an explanation for the sense that 
one's own decisions are more exogenous than the decisions of one's peers (Study 5).
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Study 4:  Perceived decision progress in self and other
When people make decisions, they often experience periods of indecision, where it seems 
as if the decision could go either way.  Indecision may be experienced in at least two ways.  The 
first is that people may feel their decisions start at an even-keeled point, where any possible 
course of action is likely (and/or each possible course of action is equally likely).  The second is 
that people may feel that their decision-making is progressing slowly, resulting in the sense that 
one is farther away from a decision than one may be in actuality.  To the extent that people 
experience more of either of these markers of indecision for their own decisions than the 
decisions of other people, it may lead them to experience their own decisions as more exogenous 
than others'.
In Study 4, participants were exposed to a hypothetical decision, which they made from 
their own perspective or from the perspective of a close friend.  They were shown five potential 
dating partners and were asked to choose the partner with whom they [their friend] would most 
want to go on a date.  As they made their decisions, they provided information about what their 
own or their friend's decision progress would be.  
I hypothesized that people would see their own decisions as starting from a more even-
keeled point, a point at which the person could possibly choose any of the five partners.  In 
simulating their friend's decision, however, I hypothesized that people would start out more 
biased – seeing their friends as having a clearer preference from the very beginning of the 
decision-making process, making others' decisions seem “fated.”  Furthermore, people were 
expected to see their own decisions as progressing more slowly than the decisions of their friend 
– that is, at each stage of the decision-making process I expected people to perceive others as 
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closer to their eventual decision than they, themselves, were.
Method
Participants
Sixty-one participants were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk in exchange for 
$0.40.
Materials and Procedures
Participants were recruited for an experiment on dating preferences.  Half of the 
participants were randomly assigned to complete the study from their own perspective (“as you 
would make decisions in an online dating context”); half were assigned to complete the study 
from the perspective of a close friend, whom they knew well (“as s/he would make decisions in 
an online dating context”).  It is important to note that participants in the “friend” condition were 
given almost no information about the study prior to selecting the friend whose decisions they 
would be simulating.  They were asked to select a friend they know very well, and only after 
they had entered this person's name and gender (so that it could be “piped” into the rest of the 
survey) were they informed of the procedures.  This rules against the explanation that 
participants deliberately chose friends for whom they had strong pre-conceived notions in the 
dating domain.
Participants began by answering some basic personality questions about themselves or 
their friend so that thoughts about the decision-maker were forefront in their minds.  They were 
then informed that they would be seeing information about five potential dating partners. 
Participants in both conditions were told that this was just a simulation, and were encouraged to 
go through with the study even if they (or their friend) were already in a committed relationship. 
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At the end of the study, they were told, they would be asked to select the partner whom they 
thought they [their friend] would most want to date.  Participants were informed that they would 
see information about all five partners in three stages.  After each stage, they were told that they 
would be answering some questions about their own [their friend's] decision-making.
I began by showing participants the first piece of information about each of the five 
people.  This was each partner's “distinctive quality.”  One partner was very “open,” another 
“funny,” another was “interested,” the fourth was “informed,” and the fifth possessed 
“conventional good looks.”  After answering questions related to indecision (described below), 
participants saw the second piece of information, “hobbies.”  Participants again answered 
questions before seeing the third piece of information, “life motto.”  After completing the third 
round of questions, participants saw the fourth and final piece of information, “personal flaws.” 
Participants knew all along how many pieces of information they would be seeing.  
After Rounds 1, 2, and 3, participants answered two questions.  The first was an estimate 
of likelihood (decision lean):  I asked participants to make a prediction, based upon the 
information they had so far, of the likelihood that they [their friend] would end up choosing each 
of the five dating partners at the end of the study.  They estimated that likelihood using a number 
from 0-100%, with the constraint that all estimates must sum to 100%.  The second question 
participants answered after each round of information was how close they [their friend] would be 
to a final decision, decision progress.  They indicated their answer on a slider, with endpoints, 
“My [his/her] mind is completely open” to “My [his/her] mind is completely made up.”
At the end of the study, participants indicated their final decision as to which dating 
partner they [their friend] would choose.
43
Results and Discussion
I first analyzed participants' reported decision progress by subjecting these ratings to a 2 
(target: self vs. other) x 3 (decision round:  one, two, three) mixed-design ANOVA, with target as 
a between subjects factor and information round as a repeated measure.  Figure 2 shows 
participants' decision progress across the three rounds of information.  The main effect of 
information round, F(2, 58) = 44.80, p < .0001, indicates that as participants accrued more 
information they anticipated that they and their friends would be closer to a decision.  The 
critical main effect of target, F(1, 59) = 7.41, p = .008, and the absence of a target x decision 
round interaction, F(2, 58) < 1, p > .50, indicate that participants saw their own decisions as 
progressing more slowly than the decisions of their friends across the entire task.  In essence, at 
each stage in the decision-making process, participants saw themselves as farther away from a 
decision than their friend would be at the same stage.
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Figure 2: Decision progress for simulated decisions of self or a 
friend by amount of information seen, Study 4.
In addition, I explored whether participants saw their own decisions, relative to those of 
their friend, as less biased toward any one focal option by analyzing the decision lean variable. 
Recall that after each of the three rounds of information, participants indicated the likelihood that 
they or their friend would end up choosing each of the five partners.  I calculated the standard 
deviation of these five likelihood estimates after each round of information.  Lower standard 
deviations indicate that each option was weighted more evenly (i.e., there was less lean toward 
any one option).  I subjected the standard deviations to the same 2 x 3 mixed-design ANOVA.  If 
participants saw their own decisions as less biased toward any one option, the standard deviation 
for their likelihood estimates should be lower than the standard deviation of the likelihood 
estimates they made for their friends.
As can be seen in Figure 3, this was indeed the case.  The ANOVA returned a main effect 
of information round, F(2, 58) = 19.23, p < .0001, indicating that as participants accrued more 
information across rounds, their estimates of which partner they or their friend were most likely 
to pick began to favor a focal partner.  Critically, there was also a main effect of target, F(1, 59) 
= 4.77, p = .03, and no decision round x target interaction, F(2, 58) < 1, p > .70.  The main effect 
of target confirmed that participants in the self condition, relative to those in the friend condition, 
felt less of a lean toward any one option at each stage in the decision.  In other words, from the 
very beginning of the decision to the very end, participants perceived more bias toward a focal 
option when they were simulating their friend's decision than when they were simulating their 
own decision.
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The results confirm the informal observations of Griffin and Tversky (1992) and expand 
them to self- and social cognition.  Participants thought they were farther away from a decision 
than their friend would be in the same situation; they also thought that their decisions were less 
foretold than were their friends' decisions.  But does different phenomenology associated with 
the simulation of decisions for self and other provide an explanation for why people see their 
own decisions as more exogenous than the decisions of their peers?  Study 5 tested this idea.
Study 5:  Perceived decision progress and exogeneity of decisions
As in Study 4, participants completed a decision-making task either from their own 
perspective or from the perspective of a friend.  Participants were informed about the American 
Jobs Act (AJA), a recent stimulus plan aimed at economic recovery in the U.S.  They were given 
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Figure 3: Degree of bias (decision lean) in the likelihood of 
choosing one partner relative to the others in simulated decisions 
for self and friend by amount of information seen, Study 4.
initial information about the attitudes of their [their friend's] political party, which, they were 
told, either supported or opposed the AJA as it is currently written.  
Participants then read two arguments in support of the AJA and two arguments in 
opposition to the AJA (offered below).  They assessed their own [their friend's] decision progress 
and decision lean at three different times during the presentation of materials.  After reading all 
the information, participants made their final decisions about whether they [their friend] would 
support or oppose the AJA.  Finally, participants answered a series of questions about the extent 
to which their own or their friend's decision was exogenous.
Method
Participants
Two-hundred twenty-six people were recruited on Amazon's Mechanical Turk.  They 
were paid $0.40 for their participation.
Materials and Procedures
Participants were randomly assigned to complete the study either from their own 
perspective or from the perspective of a friend who is similar to them in age, socioeconomic 
status, and political orientation.  Those in the friend condition entered their friend's name, and 
this information was then piped in to the rest of the survey.  
Participants began the task by answering some questions about their own or their friend's 
political orientation.  They indicated the extent to which they/their friend is politically, fiscally, 
and socially conservative on a 1-7 scale from Very conservative to Very liberal.  They also 
indicated the party with which they/their friend most closely identifies (Democratic, Republican, 
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Libertarian, Green, Independent).  This wording was selected to encourage responses even if 
participants or their friends were not officially affiliated with a particular party.
The purpose of asking these questions was two-fold.  First, it allowed me to tailor the 
experimental materials to the relevant political party.  Second, it ensured that the political beliefs 
of participants or their friends were forefront in people's minds as they proceeded to the primary 
task (this was obviously most important for participants who were simulating their friend's 
decision).
Participants were then introduced to the AJA:
Up for debate now is the passing of the American Jobs Act, a stimulus plan that includes 
a number of initiatives aimed at increasing the economic standing of Americans – both 
employed and unemployed – so that they can re-invest in the US economy, making it 
stronger and healthier. The initiatives include tax cuts for most Americans and most 
businesses, the funding of public works projects, including efforts to modernize schools 
and repair dilapidated areas within local communities, and incentives to employers for 
hiring long-time unemployed workers as well as veterans.
The estimated cost of the American Jobs Act is $447 billion, meaning that its passing will 
plunge the US government deeper into debt. This reality has sparked a heated debate 
among Americans about what, exactly, is the right thing to do. Most Americans agree that 
the road to economic recovery is putting Americans back to work and increasing overall 
wealth. The debate centers around whether the American Jobs Act is the best way to 
accomplish this.
Participants were then randomly assigned to learn either that the majority (65%) or minority 
(35%) of their/their friend's political party supported the AJA as it is currently written.  Before 
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reading arguments on both sides of the issue, participants were asked to indicate their own/their 
friend's initial leaning on the issue on a scale from 1 (Completely opposed) to 7 (Completely in  
favor).  They also reported the strength of their/their friend's current leaning (decision lean) 
using a sliding scale, anchored at Certain I [he/she] will oppose and Certain that I [he/she] will  
support.  The midpoint of the scale was labeled Could go either way.  Finally, they indicated how 
far along (decision progress) their/their friend's decision-making was using a sliding scale from 
0% (My [His/Her] mind is completely open) to 100% (My [His/Her] mind is made up).
Participants then read two brief arguments that supported their/their friend's party's stance 
toward the AJA.  Importantly, the content of these arguments did not change by political party 
identification.  After reading arguments in support of the party's stance, they answered the same 
question about their/their friend's decision lean and decision progress.  Following that, they read 
two arguments against their/their friend's party's stance, and answered both questions again.  The 
arguments participants considered were gleaned from various internet sources, and are 
summarized in Table 4.  
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Table 4: Arguments in favor of the AJA and arguments in opposition to the AJA, Study 5. 
Participants first read arguments that supported their [their friend's] party's stance.  They then 
read arguments against their [their friend's] party's stance.
Arguments in favor of the AJA
1.  The package of tax cuts and spending initiatives could add 100,000 to 150,000 jobs 
a month over the next year, according to estimates from several of the country’s best-
known forecasting firms. Many of these jobs will be created through public works 
projects – hiring workers to update schools or renovate urban areas. These jobs will 
strengthen infrastructure and make local governments less reliant upon federal aid. 
2.  The Jobs Act makes business investments tax deductible. If businesses invest 
money, they can claim tax deductions on those investments. This will incentivize 
businesses to put money into the economy to support their long-term financial 
independence.
Arguments in opposition to the AJA
1.  The Job Act proposes a “spend now, pay later” approach to economic stimulus. In 
other words, the initial $447 billion spent by the US government to promote economic 
growth will be paid for later mostly by increasing taxes in other areas. 
2.  Investing billions to cut the taxes of most Americans may not work. In recent 
history the government effectively administered $440 billion in tax cuts, and we are no 
better off economically than we were then. 
After seeing all the information, participants indicated a final decision about whether 
they/their friend would support or oppose the AJA.  They used the same 1 (Completely opposed) 
to 7 (Completely in favor) scale to indicate their/their friend's final support for the issue.
 After final decisions had been made, participants answered a series of questions about 
the extent to which party opinion influenced their own/their friend's decision-making.  The first 
question (“To what extent do you think your own [your friend's] attitude was [would be] 
influenced by the information we provided about the attitudes of [party name]?”) was answered 
on a 1-5 scale, anchored at Not at all and Entirely.  They also answered the same question about 
the extent to which the average person would be influenced by the position of their party.  Next, 
participants answered the primary dependent measure of exogeneity.  As in Studies 3A and 3B, 
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participants were asked to imagine that they/their friend had been told at the outset of the study 
that their/their friend's party had actually held the opposite position – that is, that instead of being 
told that a majority [minority] of their/their friend's party supported the Act, participants 
imagined that, in fact, a minority [majority] of their/their friend's party supported the act. 
Participants indicated what they thought their/their friend's final opinion about the AJA would 
have been under those circumstances, using a scale identical to the one in which they reported 
their/their friend's actual final decision.
Finally, participants answered a question assessing their construal of conformity. 
Participants were asked whether they/their friend would rely upon the information of their party 
when arriving at a decision, and if they/their friend did, to select the statement that captures the 
way in which the information would be used.  Participants selected from one of the following: 
I/They did not rely at all upon the attitudes of [party name]in making my/their decision [pure 
exogeneity]; I/They just did what other [party name] did [pure conformity]; and I/They used the 
attitudes of [party name] to help me/them make my/their own decision.
Results
First, I tested whether information about party support for the AJA influenced 
participants' estimates of their own/their friend's approval of the AJA, both at the beginning of 
the study (initial leaning) and at the end of the study (final decision).  Next, I assessed 
participants' estimates of the effect of party opinion on their own/their friend's final decision, as 
well as the extent to which these estimates of influence were accurate, given the observed effect. 
Third, I tested whether participants simulated their decisions as starting from a more even-keeled 
point than the decisions of their friends, and whether perceived decision progress was slower for 
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self than other.  Finally, I explored whether differences in decision lean and decision progress 
served as an explanation for self/other differences in perceived decision exogeneity.
Actual effect of party opinion on participants' decisions.  The first analysis tested 
whether the information I provided to participants about political party stance swayed 
participants' initial leaning and final opinion of the AJA (and whether the information had a 
corresponding effect on participants' predictions of their friends).  Participants' ratings of intial 
lean and final opinion (for either self or friend) were subjected to a 2 (target: self/other) x 2 
(party position: support/oppose) ANOVA.  As predicted, information about party support swayed 
participants' initial lean on the issue, F(1, 222) = 15.45, p < .0001, as well as the final decision 
they offered, F(1, 222) = 10.71, p = .001.  The main effect of party position was not qualified by 
a target x party position interaction, nor was there a main effect of target, Fs < 1. Thus, knowing 
that one's party (or one's friend's party) supported the AJA swayed initial leanings and final 
decisions toward greater support of the issue (Ms = 4.15 and 4.90 for initial leaning; Ms = 4.13 
and 4.90 for final decision, for the minority and majority support conditions, respectively).  The 
next analysis explores participants' estimates of the effect that this information exerted on their 
own decision, compared with the effect they predicted that party position would have on their 
friend.
Perceived effect of party influence.  To determine whether participants perceived 
influence in their own or their friend's decisions, I subtracted the attitude they reported as 
their/their friend's final decision about the AJA from the attitude they reported they/their friend 
would have reported if they had been told that their party's position was actually the opposite.  I 
then took the absolute value of this difference score (where higher numbers represent a larger 
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effect of party influence) and submitted this to a between-subjects t-test.
Participants thought that information about party position would exert less of an influence 
on their own decision-making (M = .57, SD = .85) than it on the decision-making of a friend (M 
= 1.19, SD = 1.32), t(224) = 4.21, p < .0001.  These estimated effects were once again 
differentially accurate.  Perceptions of influence for the self underestimated the true effect of 
party position (M = 1.016), Z = 5.49, p < .0001, whereas perceptions of influence for a friend 
overestimated the true effect, though not to a significant degree, Z = 1.48, p < .14.  Once again, it 
is useful to note the magnitude of errors for self and other:  People's underestimation of the effect 
of party position on their own decisions was almost four times greater than their overestimation 
of the effect of party position on others. 
Perceived decision progress and decision lean.  Next, I explored self/other differences 
in participants' decision simulation.  Two variables were of interest.  The first variable of interest, 
replicating Study 4, was participants' perceptions of decision progress – how close they were (or 
their friend would be) to a final decision.  This variable was measured three times during the 
study – once after learning their/their friend's party's position, once after reading arguments in 
favor of that position, and once after reading arguments against that position.  The second 
variable of interest was the extent to which participants perceived themselves/their friend as 
leaning toward one side of the issue throughout the decision-making process (decision lean).  In 
essence, this variable captured the extent to which people saw their own, versus another person's 
decision as starting from a true neutral point – 50/50, and then tracked their leaning as they 
6 In calculating the true effect of party influence, I used the party influence effect for participants in the self 
condition only.  This estimate, which is a direct indication of how much people's attitudes were swayed by party 
information, is a cleaner measure of the true effect of party influence than is an estimate that includes the effect 
of party influence on people's predictions about what their friends would think.
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progressed through the study.  
Decision progress.  The three estimates of decision progress were subjected to a 2 
(target: self/other) x 3 (round: 1, 2, 3) mixed-design ANOVA.  As in Study 4, this analysis 
returned a significant main effect of target, F(1, 224) = 15.47, p < .0001 a main effect of round, 
F(2, 223) = 44.54, p < .0001, and no significant target x round interaction, F(2, 223) < 1.  As can 
be seen from Figure 4, at each point in the decision-making process, participants saw themselves 
as farther away from a final decision than their friend would be.  
It is interesting to note that although participants' estimates for friends began and 
remained above the 50% threshold across rounds, participants' own estimates never exceeded 
51%.  This suggests that participants saw their friend's decision as more of a foregone conclusion 
after being exposed to information that supported the views of their friend's party, but never felt 
more than half way toward a decision when it was participants themselves who were forming an 
opinion.  Thus, on one measure tapping differences in the phenomenology of simulating one's 
own decision versus another person's, I obtained evidence that is very consistent with the idea 
that one's own decision, but not that of another person, feels as if it is constantly open to 
exogenous revision.
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Decision lean throughout the decision-making process.  The second measure of 
interest was participants' perceptions of the extent to which they, and their friend, were leaning 
toward a particular side of the issue before arriving at a final decision.  It was hypothesized that 
participants would see themselves as less biased toward one side or the other throughout the 
decision-making process.  In line with the idea that people see their own decisions as starting 
more from a 50/50 point than others' decisions, I anticipated that the effect would be strongest in 
the initial estimates of bias.  In other words, before being exposed to arguments for and against a 
party opinion, but after learning where one's own or one's friend's party stands on the issue, 
people should see themselves as having less of a lean toward their party's position.
I subjected the three ratings of bias (one after exposure to party opinion, one after reading 
arguments in support of one's party, and one after reading arguments opposing one's party) to a 2 
(target: self/other) x 3 (round: 1, 2, 3) mixed-design ANOVA after recoding the ratings so that 
higher scores reflected more bias toward one's own party.  This analysis returned a significant 
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Figure 4: Decision progress for simulated decisions of 
self or a friend across rounds of information, Study 5.
main effect of target, F(1, 217) = 6.25, p = .01, a significant main effect of round, F(2, 216) = 
8.52, p < .001, and a significant target x round interaction, F(2, 216) = 3.15, p < .05.  Although 
estimates for the self were lower than estimates for friends across all three rounds, the interaction 
indicated that the self/other difference at round 1, F(1, 217) = 13.66, p < .001, was greater than 
that observed in Round 2, F(1, 217) = 1.72, p < .20, and Round 3, F(1, 217) = 3.49, p < .07. 
Thus, as predicted, participants thought their own decision started at a more even-keeled (and 
less biased) place than the decisions of their friends.
Decision exogeneity as a function of meta-cognitive indecision.  Participants' estimates 
of decision progress and decision lean were highly correlated with one another across three 
rounds of information, α = 86.  As participants felt nearer to a final decision (progress), they also 
felt greater pull toward one side of the issue or the other (lean).  Thus, participants' six ratings 
were standardized and averaged to create a single index of indecision.  One can think of this 
index as ranging in metacognitive experience from The decision is still open and could go either  
way to The decision is a foregone conclusion.  As is evident from the preceding analyses, 
participants did, on average, perceive greater indecision for the self than for their friend, F(1, 
217) = 11.24, p < .001.  In the next analysis I tested whether this difference in phenomenological 
experience gave rise to the sense that one's own decisions are more exogenous than others'.
The two direct effects of self/other perspective on both exogeneity and indecision have 
already been reported.  People's own decisions felt more exogenous than those of their friend, 
and people experienced greater indecision for self than other (see Figure 5 for corresponding beta 
weights).  To test for mediation, I entered both target (self/other) and the indecision index into a 
regression predicting exogeneity.  In this analysis both variables remained significant predictors, 
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ts = 3.81 and 2.51,  ps < .02, for target and indecision, respectively, and a Sobel test indicated 
that this model fit the statistical definition for partial mediation, Z = 2.13, p < .05.  Thus, one 
reason that people's decisions seemed more exogenous than the decisions of their friends was 
that people experienced more indecision on the way to making up their own mind than they 
experienced when simulating their friend's decision.
Additional tests of exogeneity.  At the end of the study, participants were asked a series 
of face-valid questions about their perceptions of whether they or their friend would be 
influenced by the information provided about party support.  First, participants were asked about 
the extent to which they/their friend would be influenced by the position of their/their friend's 
party.  They were also asked about the extent to which the average person would be influenced 
by party stance.  Responses to these two questions (which ranged from 1-5, Not at all to Entirely) 
were submitted to a mixed-design ANOVA, with target (whether the question was about the self 
or a friend) as a between-subjects measure and question as a within-subjects measure.  The 
analysis returned a main effect of target, F(1, 224) = 14.09, p < .001, a main effect of question, 
F(1, 224) = 247.08, p < .0001, and no significant target x question interaction, F < 1.65, p > .20. 
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Figure 5: Meta-cognitive indecision partially mediates 
self/other differences in decision exogeneity, Study 5. 
Standardized beta-weights are displayed.
This pattern indicates that participants saw both their own and their friend's decisions as more 
exogenous than the decisions of the average person, but also saw their own decisions as more 
exogeneous than decisions made by a friend.
The next question participants answered was about the extent to which they used the 
information provided about the position of their party when forming their decision or (the 
corresponding question) the extent to which their friend would use the information provided 
about their party's position when forming their decision.  Once again, participants reported using 
the information to a lesser degree than their friend would (Ms = 1.94 and 2.59, SDs = .90 and 
1.02, for self and other, respectively), t(224) = 5.07, p < .0001.7  A Sobel test revealed a 
marginally significant pattern of partial mediation by the indecision index, Z = 1.92, p = .055, 
suggesting that participants' relative blindness to their own use of party information was in part 
due to the indecision they felt while forming their decision.
To what extent are decisions actually foretold?  The data collected here allowed me to 
test whether people, when expressing indecision on the part of the self, were truly as far away 
from a decision as they thought they were.  Even though participants reported feeling indecision, 
it may well be that participants were underestimating their actual progress to a decision.  To 
determine this, I examined participants' final decisions as a function of their initial estimate of 
how likely they were to support versus oppose the AJA.  Thus, for participants in the self 
condition only, I recoded their final decisions as either support for the AJA (65% of cases), 
7 Another question asked participants “Which of the following statements best captures how you [your friend] 
used [would use] the information?”  Participants selected from three nominal response options (described in the 
Method section).  Participants' responses provide additional evidence for perceived exogeneity on the part of the 
self.  In the self condition, 54% of people indicated that “I did not use the information,” while in the friend 
condition, only 40% of participants indicated the corresponding statement.  The remainder of participants 
indicated some degree of influence by party position.  These self/other differences in responding were 
significant, χ2 (1, N = 223) = 4.25, p < .05.
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opposition to the AJA (31%), or indifferent (3%), based upon whether their final decision was 
above, below, or at the midpoint of the decision scale.  Next, I examined participants' initial 
predictions about how likely they would be to support the AJA at the end of the study (these were 
offered after participants learned their party's stance, but before participants had been given any 
real information about the Act).  I then plotted the actual distribution of support for the AJA 
against participants' estimates of how likely they would be to support the AJA before reading any 
substantive information.  The results of this analysis are depicted in Figure 6.
Of primary interest is the area in the middle of the graph – the point (~50%) at which 
participants estimated that their decision could go either way.  Immediately visible is that at that 
point, on average, participants were actually farther along in their decision than they thought. 
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Figure 6: Relationship between participants' perceived decision progress (after learning the 
stance of their party) and their actual progress toward a decision, Study 5.  The reference 
line is depicted in light gray.
Participants who, on average, thought that they were 51% likely to favor the AJA at the end of 
the study ended up favoring the AJA a full 74% of the time.  Those who thought they were 61% 
likely to favor the AJA ended up favoring the Act 82% of the time.  On the other side of the 50% 
mark, those who thought they were 58% likely to oppose the AJA (seen as 42% likely to support 
it in Figure 6) in fact opposed the AJA 75% of the time, and those who thought they were 66% 
likely to oppose the AJA in fact ended up opposing it 89% of the time.  Thus, people's perception 
of their initial decision start-point turned out to underestimate just how far along in the decision 
participants actually were.
Discussion
Study 5 tied self/other differences in perceived decision exogeneity to the meta-cognitive 
experience of indecision.  People experienced more indecision when they simulated their own 
decision-making relative to when they simulated someone else's; because of this, they 
underestimated the impact of extraneous variables on their own decisions, while acknowledging 
the impact of these variables on others.
People estimated that their friends' views toward the AJA would be more susceptible to 
party influence than their own views would be.  They also, in a face valid way, reported that their 
friends would use information about their party's stance more than they themselves would.  In 
both instances, people were wrong about themselves.  The views of the party impacted people's 
final decisions about the AJA, whether that final decision was participant's own or the decision 
they expected their friend would make.  However, participants showed little insight into just how 
much impact that information had had on them.  Participants in this study wildly overestimated 
the exogeneity of their own views, but estimated the exogeneity of their friend's views fairly 
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accurately.  Why did participants “miss” their own susceptibility to influence?
Data from Study 5 suggests that perceptions of exogeneity are due, in part, to the meta-
cognitive feeling that one's decision is still open to revision.  At all points in the study, 
participants experienced more indecision when deciding for themselves than when deciding for 
someone else.  They felt that their own decisions started from a more even-keeled place than 
their friend's decision would.  They also felt farther away from a final decision at all points in the 
study than they anticipated their friend would be.  Thus, one reason people may underestimate 
the impact of various biasing factors upon their own decisions is that they fail to experience the 
“pull” that these factors have on their own decisions.  Regardless of the external circumstances, 
people feel that their decisions are open and yet to be determined, and this meta-cognitive feeling 
may drown out actual biasing effect of a variety of extraneous variables.
Data from Study 5 also suggest that this experienced indecision on the part of the self is, 
in large part, illusory.  Participants' estimates of decision progress underestimated just how far 
along they actually were in their decisions.  Thus, someone who estimated that he was leaning 
ever-so slightly toward one conclusion (i.e., that he was 51% likely to support the AJA) in 
actuality was more than 70% likely to arrive at a final decision that conformed to that initial lean. 
From the initial introduction of the biasing information, people's decisions were more foretold 
than they could appreciate.  Their reported indecision was a somewhat poor reflection of true 
amount of indeterminacy in participants' final decisions.
Responding to a self-knowledge riddle
According to social-psychological lore, Amos Tversky often observed that “Everyone 
always knows what you're going to do before you do.”  The data provided here confirm this 
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suspicion and offer an explanation for it (which, quite appropriately, comes from Tversky's – and 
Griffin's – own musings).
First, people do seem to have superior insight into others' decision-making than their 
own.  They understand the impact of extraneous variables on other people's thoughts, but deny 
this same impact in themselves.  Tversky's remark, however, reflects not only this superior 
accuracy, but the time-course of this accuracy:  That the self is late to the party in prospective 
understanding of behavior – and that peers have a temporal advantage in knowing what one is 
likely to do.  The data herein suggest an answer to this problem as well.  People do not seem to 
register just how close to a final decision they are.  The meta-cognitive experience of indecision 
may interfere with people's understanding of just how rapidly one's own decision is progressing 
toward a conclusion.  Because peers do not simulate this same degree of indecision, they have a 
clearer picture of a person's decision trajectory than the self does.
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Chapter 5
General Discussion
“I wear the chain I forged in life...  I made it link by link, and yard by yard; I girded it on 
of my own free will, and of my own free will I wore it.” 
-Marley's ghost, Charles Dickens, A Christmas Carol
Suppose for a moment that in Dickens' classic meeting between Ebeneezer Scrooge and 
the ghost of Marley, Scrooge, and not Marley, had reflected upon the life of the deceased.  Would 
he have seen, as Marley himself did, a solitary chain-maker, who forges each link – each choice 
– with grim self-determination?  Or might he have told a different tale about how the chain 
around Marley's neck, and, indeed, each individual link, came to be?
The data presented herein suggest that Marley and Scrooge – self and other – would 
diverge in their understanding of the source of these decisions.  Whereas people feel that their 
own decisions and behaviors emerge from exogenous choices that are relatively invariant to 
extraneous influence, they have an altogether different sense of the source of others' decisions. 
People see others' decisions as comparatively less exogenous – more susceptible to direct 
shaping by forces extraneous to the agent's will and less open to intermittent revision.  The 
results of six studies lend support to this self/other asymmetry in perceptions of exogeneity and 
provide an in-road to understanding how and why these differences emerge.
Findings from Chapter 2 suggest that people perceive greater active choice in their own 
decisions than other people's.  Participants in Study 1 indicated that, compared to the average 
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person, their daily decisions involved more active choice and deliberation.  In Study 2, even 
behaviors that, from the outside, appeared to involve minimal choice – such as going along with 
a group or following norms – were construed more as exogenous acts for the self than for others. 
Thus, people saw their own acts of conformity as emblematic of their choice to conform, 
whereas others' acts of conformity were construed with less reference to intervening choice 
processes.  
One consequence of perceiving one's own decisions in terms of exogenous choice is that 
influences from extraneous sources should be lost or drowned out in people's understanding of 
the forces that shape their own decisions.  Thus, compared to how they view others' decisions, 
people (erroneously) see their own decisions as freer from direct external sway.  Results from 
Studies 3A, 3B, and 5 confirm this hypothesis:  In all three studies, people underestimated the 
true effect of peer influence on their own decisions, believing (wrongly) that their decisions were 
independent of the collective opinion.  People's estimates of the degree to which their peers were 
influenced were far more accurate (3-4 times more accurate) than their estimates for the self.  
Finally, Studies 4 and 5 sourced these self/other differences in perceived exogeneity to 
the way in which people simulate their own versus others' decision-making.  In simulating the 
choices of a friend, people perceived greater initial bias toward one of the decision options, and 
faster progress through a decision.  Their simulations of their own decisions, by comparison, 
indicated a great deal more indecision:  Decisions made by the self started at a more unbiased 
starting point, and rarely did estimates of decision progress for the self exceed 50% – the point at 
which a decision feels mostly made.  Study 5 tied these differences in decision simulation to 
self/other differences in perceived exogeneity.  One reason decisions feel freer for the self than 
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for other people is that decisions for the self feel more open to revision at all points along the 
way.  In this, people are once again overestimating their own freedom.  An ancillary analysis 
from Study 5 suggested that people were actually much farther along in their decision-making 
than they they knew.
A number of questions and future directions are open for further inquiry.  In what follows, 
I will address some of the more pressing issues related to the work.
Direct versus indirect influence:  The true self/other asymmetry?
One way of conceiving of self/other asymmetries in decision exogeneity is to say that, 
compared to others' decisions, people feel their own are immune to extraneous influences.  If this 
were the case, one would expect that across decisions and across influences, people would 
always assume that they are comparatively more unaffected than their peers. I would argue, 
however, that this conception of exogeneity misses a critical point, and fails to capture the 
pattern of responding in these six studies.  Decision exogeneity is not about total immunity from 
social influence, but about the capacity for decision-makers to consent to being influenced – i.e., 
to choose whether or not to allow extraneous variables to exert an influence on the decisions they 
ultimately make, and to avoid having their decisions contaminated by unwanted influences.
Take a somewhat straightforward case of social influence:  the impact of one's family and 
one's childhood environment on shaping a person's current values or ambitions.  In early work 
leading up to this dissertation, I attempted to demonstrate a self/other difference in the perceived 
impact of these variables on one's own or a friend's values and ambitions.  The prediction was 
that if people feel they are utterly immune to extraneous influence, they should see less of an 
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impact of these variables on their own values and ambitions than on others'.  Yet, in three studies, 
I failed to obtain this difference, and sometimes I obtained the opposite result.
In one study, for example, I asked participants to imagine that they or a friend they knew 
well had grown up in a different family or a different geographical location, and to reflect upon 
the extent to which their/their friend's values and ambitions would be the same as they currently 
are.  Very often, responses for self and other were identical; in some cases participants said their 
values and ambitions would be more impacted by such a change than their friend's would. 
Whatever the self/other asymmetry was, it certainly was not an outright denial that the self is, in 
some measure, a product of its environment.
Instead, the self/other asymmetry in exogeneity seems to be more about the route by 
which extraneous influences exert their influence upon the agent.  As depicted in Figure 1 and 
demonstrated in Study 2, decision exogeneity is really about whether extraneous variables are 
perceived as exerting a direct versus indirect effect on one's decisions and behavior.  People see 
their decisions as more exogenous than others' in the sense that they see themselves relative to 
others as having a greater ability to choose whether or not to be affected by other people, 
information, or other social pressures.  Thus, for the self, the impact of an extraneous pressure on 
a final decision is mediated through the decision-maker's choice of whether or not to be swayed. 
For others, this intermediate choice is less apparent, and extraneous variables seem to exert a 
direct effect on decisions, rendering them (seemingly) less exogenous.  In other words, people, 
themselves, feel they ultimately consent to being influenced, whereas others just are influenced 
by extraneous forces.
This analysis helps to explain how it is that people can believe both that they and others 
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are products of their environment and that their decisions are more exogenous than others' are. 
People clearly grow, learn, and change based upon extraneous influences from their social 
environment – and, it seems, both self and other acknowledge this.  How these variables exert an 
influence, though, may be the key to understanding this particular self/other asymmetry.  The self 
may experience change because of choices to accept and learn from these external sources; 
others, though, may just change in more or less direct proportion to the strength of the influence.
Exogeneity and mere self-enhancement
The experience of meta-cognitive indecision as a mechanism underlying self/other 
asymmetries in decision exogeneity is essentially a non-motivational account of why people 
perceive themselves as possessing more agency than others.  However, an alternative explanation 
of many of the findings presented in this paper is motivational in nature.  This alternative 
explanation argues that because people want to believe that they are freer than others, they 
experience their own thoughts and decisions, relative to the thoughts and decisions of others, 
with more of an exogeneous signature.  In simplest terms, perhaps people believe their decisions 
are more exogeneous than others' merely because that is what they want to believe.
Two versions of this objection prompt two different responses with regard to the current 
work.  The first version of this alternative explanation is that self/other differences in perceived 
exogeneity are nothing but motivated beliefs about the self's superiority to others.  Here, it seems 
unlikely that a desire to think well of the self could explain the variety of responses observed in 
these studies.  A survey of participants' responses in Study 1 suggests that the items on which 
participants exhibited the greatest bias toward seeing exogeneity in the self relative to others 
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were decisions centering around what to have for lunch and dinner, what time to go to bed, what 
time to get up in the morning, and decisions about class attendance and homework.  Only two of 
these (the last) seem to carry much implication for one's global self-worth, and so it seems 
implausible that self-enhancement underlies the effect.  Quite notably, participants saw 
themselves as relatively more passive than others in their decisions to engage in potential “time-
wasting” activities (watching TV and going on Facebook), indicating that they were 
comparatively less agentic than others at avoiding these things.  Thus, it seems unlikely that 
people see their own decisions as more exogeneous than others' simply because they are 
motivated to do so.
Notwithstanding, a weaker version of this alternative explanation is that self/other 
differences in presumed exogeneity are felt independent of a person's ongoing motivations, even 
though the belief in oneself as an exogenous agent is beneficial to one's global self-worth.  The 
possibility that conceiving of oneself as an exogeneous agent is rewarding, even if reward is not 
the only reason that people see themselves as more exogenous than others, seems quite 
reasonable.  There is no doubt that the motivation to see one's self in a positive light plays a role 
in a host of asymmetrical beliefs about self and other (for reviews, see Critcher, Helzer & 
Dunning, 2010; Helzer & Dunning, 2012), likely including this one.
To this end, it is interesting to note that culturally-based differences in models of agency 
(disjoint versus conjoint) include both descriptive and prescriptive elements.  In cultures favoring 
disjoint models of agency, decisions arising from free, exogenous choice are not merely agentic, 
but praiseworthy, as well (Savani et al., 2010; Markus & Kitayama, 2003; Markus, Uchida, 
Omoregie, Townsend, & Kitayama, 2006).  It seems quite plausible that the desire to see one's 
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self as a cultural exemplar – as a being who exhibits culturally-accepted standards of behavior 
(such as free, unbounded choice) – is a key factor that feeds into the self/other asymmetry 
documented here.
It may be, though, that the normative component of exogeneity (i.e., the message that it is 
good to be an independent decision-maker, uninfluenced by extraneous inputs) exerts its greatest 
influence on the development of the belief that one is an exogenous agent (perhaps more so than 
others are).  Once such a belief is crystallized it persists without further motivation to think well 
of the self.  There is evidence, for example, that children (in an American sample) show an early 
tendency to give more causal weight to their own agentic actions than to the actions of another 
agent when trying to disambiguate cause-and-effect in probabilistic settings (Kushnir, Wellman, 
& Gelman, 2009).  How might this early bias develop?
Embodied interaction with the world, which allows for learning of contingencies between 
one's own initiated movements and environmental effects (Thelen, 1995) may provide the basis 
for the children's experience of agency.  These experiential cues then may combine with a variety 
of social-cultural learning mechanisms that stress dominant models of agency.  For example, 
there is good evidence that cues to agency are embedded deeply within linguistic structure 
(Fausey, Long,  Inamori, & Boroditsky, 2010).  Through everyday interaction, children will learn 
to narrate their own experience, as well as that of other people, in terms of culturally-specific 
conceptions of disjoint or conjoint agency.  They will also be rewarded for adopting dominant 
models of agency within their culture.  Children in cultures valuing disjoint agency, for example, 
will be reinforced both for outward behaviors that display exogenous action as well as for 
narrating their experiences in terms of their own independent thoughts and choices.
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Given that cultural messages about agency are communicated via early learning, ongoing 
cultural norms, and linguistic structure, it seems unlikely that asymmetries in viewing the self 
more than others as an exogenous agent are due merely to a person's ongoing motivations. 
Instead, it seems to be engrained deeply, emerging out of cultural expectations (which may 
include motivational components) and direct sensorimotor interaction with the world.  Once this 
belief is in place, it may operate semi-independently of a desire to think well of the self.
How does culture produce biases in perceived exogeneity?
On a related note, while it is clear that cultural factors play a large role in determining 
people's sense of themselves as agents, there is a great need for future research to explore how 
culture might shape asymmetric perceptions of agency.  There are many possibilities for how 
cultural differences in agency may play out in terms of self/other discrepancies.  The following 
list is a non-exhaustive sampling of these possibilities, with comments on what each possibility 
(were it true) might say about the origins of this bias.
First, it may be that people understand their own behavior relative to others' behavior 
more in terms of the model of agency that is culturally-prescribed.  Thus, individuals from 
cultures featuring conjoint models of agency may detect more “conjoint-ness” in their own 
behavior than the average person's, just as individuals in these six studies reported greater 
exogeneity in themselves relative to others.  Such a finding might highlight the important role 
that normative concerns (seeing oneself relative to others as a cultural exemplar) play in people's 
perceptions of themselves as agents.
Second, it could be that people from cultures with conjoint models of agency detect less 
70
exogeneity in their own behavior overall, but still see themselves as relatively more exogenous 
than other people.  Results of this kind might point a finger to the importance that experiential 
cues (such as meta-cognitive components of decision-making) play in people's conceptions of 
their own agency relative to others.
A third possibility is that self/other asymmetries in perceptions of exogeneity are unique 
to cultures featuring a disjoint model of agency, and that individuals from other cultures may see 
just as much exogeneity in others' behavior as they see in their own (see, for example, Balcetis, 
Dunning, & Miller, 2008).  Such a finding might implicate the role of self-enhancement in 
producing the results obtained here.  Insofar as individuals from East Asian cultures, for 
example, are less prone to the self-enhancement biases observed in individuals from Western 
cultures (Heine & Hamamura, 2007), it could be that the presence or absence of a self/other 
asymmetry in exogeneity for Westerners and Easterners, respectively, would reflect a broader 
tendency toward and away from self-enhancement more generally.
Finally, perhaps a meaningful cultural account of agency would look not only at cultural 
differences in the concept of agency, but also at differences in the conception of self (cf. Heine, 
2005).  Thus, it is possible that asymmetries in perceptions of agency do exist cross-culturally, 
but that one must broaden one's scope in terms of the units along which these asymmetrical 
beliefs hold (for a thoughtful application of this kind of reasoning, see Hoshino-Browne et al., 
2005).  Thus, before beginning a full-blown cross-cultural inquiry into this topic, researchers 
would need to first nail down how it is that individuals from non-Western cultures cleave the 
distinction between “self” and “other,” and then apply this understanding to culturally-specific 
models of agency.
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Wrong about ourselves, yes.  Right about others?
Across studies 3A, 3B and 5, people consistently saw their own decisions as more 
exogenous than others'.  Also consistent across these three studies, people's overestimation of 
their own exogeneity was 3-4 times less accurate than people's underestimation of others' 
exogeneity.  The only inconsistency in the data across studies is whether people's understanding 
of others is, in an absolute sense, accurate or biased.  In Studies 3A and 3B, estimates of others' 
exogeneity significantly underestimated the actual degree to which others were free from 
influence; in Study 5, people still underestimated others' exogeneity, but not to a significant 
degree.
There may be a number of reasons for this discrepancy, and these reasons vary in the 
extent to which they are theoretically informative.  One of the more interesting possibilities is 
that participants in Study 5 (whose estimates of others did not differ from reality) were assessing 
the exogeneity of a known other, whereas participants in the other two studies were assessing the 
exogeneity of “the average person.”  This would suggest that people might have good awareness 
of the effects of extraneous variables on people in general, but an even better awareness of how 
much their friends, family members, and acquaintances are swayed by these forces.  
A second difference that may be informative is that the task in Study 5 was a truer 
simulation of actual decision-making than were the tasks in the other studies.  That is, 
participants in Study 5 went all the way through a hypothetical decision, including consideration 
of relevant arguments, to assess their friends' exogeneity.  Perhaps doing so allowed them to 
experience more indecision than was present in the tasks facing participants in Studies 3A and 
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3B, leading to more accurate estimates of actual exogeneity.  
This small discrepancy notwithstanding, there are some general conclusions to be drawn 
with regard to the accuracy of people's perceptions of decision exogeneity.  First, people in these 
studies were way off with regard to how exogeneous their own decisions are.  Second, people's 
understanding of others' exogeneity was much better, and much more reflective of reality, than 
their understanding of their own exogeneity.  Third, the likelihood that one would accurately 
assess the amount of exogeneity present in a peer's decision was and is, on average, much higher 
than the likelihood that one would accurately assess one's own exogeneity.  Thus, on all 
important metrics, people showed superior insight into the amount of freedom present in their 
peers' decisions, but failed to apply this same insight to understanding themselves.
Implications for social-psychological well-being
People's overestimation of their own decision exogeneity may carry downstream 
consequences both for their interactions with peers and for their understanding of themselves in 
relation to the world.  Thus, these errors may have real implications for social and psychological 
well-being.
Implications for getting along with others.  Because exogeneity is a normative as well 
as descriptive conception of agency, seeing one's own thoughts and decisions as more exogenous 
than the average person implies that people will see their own decisions as more rational, valid, 
and defensible than the average person's.  Similarly, seeing others' decision-making as 
comparatively more open to extraneous influence than the self's paints others' decisions as less 
reliable and more whimsical than those made by the self.  The consequences for these 
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judgmental errors may be widespread and problematic.
Relevant to this, Kennedy and Pronin (2008) have shown that conflict resulting from 
disagreement on specific issues is escalated by the belief that the other person's views are more 
biased than one's own.  In these studies, participants rated those with whom they disagreed as 
more driven by self-interest or ideology, and as a result, reported less willingness to cooperate 
with them.  It seems likely that one might obtain the same results if, instead of focusing upon 
other people's beliefs and the biases that they may reveal, people appealed to the misguided sense 
of their own decisions are more exogenous than another person's.  Where these two different 
lines of research converge is on the ease with which one might, as a result of seeing others as 
more biased or less exogenous, dismiss the other person's position.
Another potentially negative social consequence of this asymmetry stems from the results 
of Studies 4 and 5.  People failed to register the amount of indecision present in others' decision-
making, imagining that others' decisions were more foretold from the start than their own.  This 
difference in phenomenology may decrease observers' sense of empathy for decision-makers 
facing tough choices.  When deciding on a place to work, a house to buy, or even just which 
dinner to select from a menu of delicious options, observers will likely fail to appreciate just how 
agonizingly difficult these choices can be for the decision-maker.  Thus, they may be less 
empathetic while the decision is being made (“This can't be that tough of a choice– get on with 
it!”) as well as after the decision is made, particularly when the decision proves sub-optimal 
(“Well, you should have thought about it more carefully!”). 
Implications for knowing the self.  The other error documented in this paper – that 
people think their decisions are more exogenous than they actually are – likely carries both costs 
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and benefits to people's self-understanding.  On the positive side, it is widely speculated that a 
belief in free will, self-determination, or personal control is a psychologically beneficial illusion. 
This belief has been supported by several lines of empirical research (Langer, 1975; Ryan & 
Deci, 2000; Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower, & Gruenewald, 2000; Vohs & Schooler, 2008), 
lending credence to the idea that some degree of felt personal control is probably motivating (or 
at least that lacking a feeling of ownership over one's actions is demotivating).  Notwithstanding, 
the crucial question unanswered by all extant literature is not whether unrealistic beliefs about 
personal agency or exogeneity can be psychologically beneficial, but whether such beliefs are 
necessary for psychological functioning, and, if so, whether there are boundaries on the 
relationship between unrealistic beliefs about personal freedom and psychological well-being. 
It seems quite likely that in certain situations, unrealistic beliefs about the extent to which 
one is an exogenous agent may be intra-personally harmful.  It is clear that seeing the self as an 
unbounded agent can lead to errors in self-assessment, particularly about one's future 
achievements (Helzer & Dunning, 2012).  When these errors are in consequential domains, 
putting too much stake in one's ability to willfully control the future may lead to dashed 
expectations and costly mistakes.  Similarly, successful planning for the future may require a 
full-on acknowledgment of just how susceptible one is to extraneous influences and 
environmental snags.  Understanding the bounds on one's agency may allow people to plan for 
the future in a way that ultimately gives them more actual control over the situation.  For 
example, dieters who understand their susceptibility to the siren's call of junk food may re-claim 
control over their behaviors by opting not to stock the house full of temptations.
In addition, it is possible that the psychological literature has overstated the importance of 
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personal control in its models of psychological well-being.  Without a doubt, feeling more 
control over one's life than is objectively warranted may lend psychological benefit in many 
documented cases, but there are clearly important exceptions to this rule that could serve as the 
basis for interesting psychological research.  It seems, for example, that, at their extreme, 
feelings of exogenity, like feelings of freedom more generally (Schwartz, 2000), may prove 
stifling.  Individuals who constantly attempt to exert their influence upon the world and mold it 
to their liking will incur failure more often than they will success, and this may lead to 
paradoxical effects on their feelings of general well-being.  In addition, conceiving of one's self 
as an exogenous agent means that when decisions go awry, the person has no one but him- or 
herself to blame.  Thus, the sense of one's self as an exogenous agent may prompt feelings of 
regret or dissatisfaction just as easily as it does pride, security, and self-praise.
Similarly, common sense suggests that the acceptance of the limits of control may be just 
as psychologically beneficial as continued striving to a fruitless end.  If exogeneity is the belief 
that one has single-handedly authored a decision or the course of one's life, perhaps there is some 
deep benefit to acknowledging the contributions of one's co-authors along the way.  There may 
be tremendous psychological benefit to understanding one's inseparability from the agents, 
situational forces, and random events that have brought a person to a particular point in their 
lives.  If there is, perhaps weakening the illusion of exogeneity is an alternative route to well-
being.  
Meta-cognitive components of free will and the perverse effects of free will on decision making
The studies here document a heretofore unstudied meta-cognitive cue that gives rise to 
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the sense of free will:  indecision.  The feeling of indecision along the way to final position 
provides the sense that at any point along the decision-making path, one can revise one's current 
conclusion.  As a result, whatever conclusions are eventually arrived at seem to have arisen from 
an exogenous decision-making process. Thus, this work contributes to a broader literature 
identifying experiential cues to free will (Aarts & Van de Bos, 2011; Preston & Wegner, 2008; 
Van der Weiden, Aarts, & Ruys, 2011; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999).  However, this work takes the 
additional step of exploring how the relative presence and absence of these cues in self- and 
social cognition help to explain a broader tendency for people to see themselves as possessing 
more free will than others.
Indecision as a meta-cognitive cue to exogeneity may take many forms, some of which 
were not explored here.  Consider, for example, results from Koehler (1994), who asked 
decision-makers to provide answers to a number of trivia questions and then to assess their 
confidence in the answers they had just generated.  When Koehler compared these confidence 
ratings to the confidence ratings of observers, who had merely evaluated decision-makers' 
answers (without generating their own), he found that decision-makers were less confident than 
observers that the final answer they provided was correct.  This result was traced to differences 
in experienced decision conflict.  Decision-makers had privileged access to all the alternative 
responses they might have given to the questions, and this lessened their confidence in the 
ultimate answer they provided.  Observers, by contrast, were tasked only with testing the 
response that decision-makers had given.  Because they were less aware of the alternatives that 
decision-makers had considered, they were more confident in the accuracy of the final answer.
On a slightly different reading, these results could speak to a meta-cognitive account of 
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self/other differences in free will and exogeneity.  Having considered alternative possibilities, 
decision-makers are more aware of how easily any one decision could have been different.  This 
ease in generating counterfactual possibilities may then be taken as evidence of one's own 
freedom to have done otherwise (whether this feeling is merely apparent or real).  Because 
observers are, by comparison, less aware of this underlying conflict, final decisions may appear 
from the outside as more inevitable and predictable than they seem to decision-makers 
themselves.
Exogeneity gone wrong?  Perverse effects of indecision on preference and choice. 
Whether or not motivated processes play a causal role in people's overestimation of their 
decision exogeneity, it is clear that people do not take kindly to having their belief in free will 
challenged.  People want to maintain the sense that they have ultimate freedom to actively shape 
the course of their own lives, and one reason for this is because they feel that such freedom will 
allow them to lead the lives they want to live (Schwartz, 2000).  
With this in mind, the decision-making literature offers a cautionary tale.  Just as there 
may be negative consequences associated with holding unrealistic views of one's own decision 
exogeneity, perhaps there are unforeseen negative consequences associated with the very meta-
cognitive experience that underlies this sense of freedom.  Past research suggests that the meta-
cognitive experience of indecision may, in some cases, lead to perverse decision-making.  That 
is, injecting decisions with greater uncertainty may cause people to arrive at decisions that they 
would have otherwise avoided.  If so, in at least some cases, people's sense of themselves as 
exogenous agents may ironically limit their ability to pursue the course of action that is best for 
them.
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In a paper aptly titled “On the Pursuit and Misuse of Useless Information,” Bastardi and 
Shafir (1998) presented participants with a series of decision scenarios.  In one, for example, 
they asked participants to imagine that they were considering registering for a course with 
interesting content and an excellent professor.  Participants were told that next semester (when 
they would be enrolling in the course) this professor would be on leave, replaced by a less 
popular colleague.  They were then asked whether, in light of this information, they would enroll 
in the course or not.  Eighty-two percent of participants indicated that they would still enroll.  
In a second condition, participants were given the same scenario, except they were told 
that it was currently unknown whether the popular professor would be instructing the course. 
These participants were given the option to enroll, not enroll, or wait to find out who would be 
instructing.  Note that for these participants, the worst-case scenario is one in which the popular 
professor is on leave – the very situation in which participants in the first condition found 
themselves.  Thus, according to a rational choice model, participants' enrollment rates should, if 
anything, exceed the 82% observed in the first condition.  Nonetheless, a full 56% of participants 
chose to wait, and only 42% of participants jumped at the opportunity to enroll.
What happened with the participants who opted to wait?  They were then told that, as it 
turned out, the professor would be on leave next semester, and were asked whether they would 
like to enroll in the course.  After having waited for the information, participants imbued it with 
great importance, and as a result made a very different choice than they would have made had 
they just offered up a decision immediately.  Only about half of those who waited ended up 
deciding to enroll in the course. 
Similar work by Van de Ven, Gilovich, and Zeelenberg (2010) suggests that the simple 
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act of delaying a decision can change the decision that is ultimately made.  In their studies, 
participants were given the choice between two options (say, two investment opportunities).  One 
option was made focal either by instantiating it as the default or by making it the 
recommendation of an adviser.   Participants were then induced either to make their choice 
immediately or to choose to wait until the end of the study to decide (a third condition was added 
in which a delay was imposed, rather than chosen).  The question was how often people would 
choose the focal option over its alternative.
Across several studies, participants who opted to delay the decision proved less likely to 
ultimately choose the focal option than those who made the decision immediately or those who 
were forced to delay.  It is crucial to note that the decision to delay was imposed (subtly) by the 
experimenters, and was thus independent of participants' idiosyncratic evaluation of the 
information.  In addition, the researchers found that simply priming doubt in participants' minds 
prior to a decision led them to “attach” that doubt to the focal option, and to choose that option 
less often.  Thus, the mere act of putting off the choice, and the doubt it engenders, changed the 
decision participants ultimately made, and did so for reasons that had nothing to do with the 
decision options themselves.
Might the meta-cognitive experience of indecision that is central to people's sense of 
themselves as exogenous agents produce a similar effect on people's decision-making?  In 
essence, the phenomenology of exogenous agency is one of delayed decision-making – a 
withholding of a final choice until all the information has been considered.  It seems plausible, 
then, that when faced with a decision for which there is a clear front-runner option, the 
experience of exogenous agency may predispose people toward decisions they might otherwise 
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not make.  People may be less likely to decide in line with a prevailing course of action, which to 
themselves and others will make their decisions seem freer and less predictable (Pronin & 
Kugler, 2010).  The irony, of course, is that decisions that go against a prevailing option are no 
more or less free than decisions that conform to that option, particularly if the decision to reject 
the front-runner is driven by people misattributing their indecision to the most prominent option.
If this analysis turns out to be true, it raises an additional concern about the consequences 
of feeling (too) free.  To be sure, there will be cases where acting against a prevailing option can 
unroute people from habitual behaviors and from repeating the same decisions over and over 
again.  In another sense, though, if those prevailing options prevail because they are truly better 
(as measured by some internal or external standard), then “feeling free” may lead people to act 
against their best interest, rejecting the very courses of action that might otherwise have 
contributed to their happiness and well-being.
Conclusion:  The agency bias reconsidered
The literature on self-knowledge and self-prediction has provided numerous 
demonstrations of an agency bias in people's representations of themselves relative to others. 
Agentic states, such as aspirations, intentions, goals, and introspective contents, stand at the 
forefront of people's sense of themselves, but are given comparatively less of a leading role in 
people's representations of others.  Recent work (Helzer & Dunning, 2012) has confirmed that 
when people apply this asymmetric knowledge toward understanding the future, it leads to 
systematic patterns of errors and accuracy in self- and social prediction.  Because people place 
too much emphasis upon their own agentic states, and not enough emphasis upon other causal 
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factors, they reliably overestimate the control they will have to shape future outcomes to their 
liking.  Thus, these predictions prove too optimistic relative to actual future achievement.  Peers, 
because they weight agentic information differently (and more appropriately), largely avoid this 
overoptimism.
Why is it that people place such emphasis upon their own agentic states even though they 
recognize the limited predictive power of other people's goals, aspirations, and intentions?  The 
data and theorizing in this paper provide one answer:  People see themselves, relative to others, 
as exogenous agents, whose decisions and behaviors are less subject to extraneous influence.  In 
conceiving uniquely of their choices as active and independent interventions on the world, 
people are blinded to the role that extraneous forces play in shaping behavior – even if they 
anticipate the role these forces play in determining the behavior of their peers.
Thus, when people envision themselves in relation to their past and future, the picture 
looks very different from one that a peer might paint.  In looking back, people are less aware 
than others would be of the extraneous forces that have exerted direct influence on their current 
states.  In looking forward, people attribute greater potency to the causal power of their current 
agentic states than others would, in part because they once again underestimate just how much of 
a role extraneous forces will play in determining their future choices, decisions, and behaviors. 
In seeing themselves uniquely as exogenous agents, people fail to fully grasp the immense causal 
web that leads them to think, believe, and act the way they do, even though they maintain a more 
enlightened perspective on the forces that shape the lives of others.
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APPENDIX
Conformity scenarios from Study 2 (self condition only).  Response options have been  
standardized so that Choice 1 designates the endogenous construal and Choice 2 designates the 
exogenous construal.
Voting decision
It's the day of a local election and you are unfamiliar with the candidates. It's important for you 
to vote, so you ask a few of your neighbors who they are voting for.  You end up voting along 
with their suggestions.
Which of these is a better description of your behavior:
Choice 1: My neighbors told me who to vote for
Choice 2: I listened to their advice
Television program
You watch the first episode of a new TV comedy and dislike it.  You watch the second episode 
with friends and find yourself laughing at more of the jokes.
Which of these is a better description of your behavior:
Choice 1: I went along with the group
Choice 2: I found the jokes funnier
Camera purchase
You are on the market for a new camera.  You go to Best Buy, and the sales person shows you the 
most popular camera (the one most people are buying).  You end up buying that model.
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Which of these is a better description of your behavior:
Choice 1: I just did what other people did
Choice 2: I made an informed decision
Whistle-blowing
You see someone cut in line at the grocery store.  No one around you seems to be saying 
anything.  You say nothing about it and wait your turn.
Which of these is a better description of your behavior:
Choice 1: I stayed quiet, like everyone else
Choice 2: I decided not to make a scene
“Green” practice
You go to a hotel, where a sign in the bathroom asks you to help the hotel take care of the 
environment by reusing your towel.  The sign says 70% of guests reuse their towels.  For the 
duration of your stay, you use the same towel. 
Which of these is a better description of your behavior:
Choice 1:  I followed the hotel norm
Choice 2: I decided to help out
Money donation
There is a fundraiser happening on in town. Student groups are collecting money for charity.  As 
you walk by the table, you are hounded with requests to give some spare change.  You deposit 
$0.75 in the box and walk on.
Which of these is a better description of your behavior:
Choice 1: I gave in to pressure
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Choice 2: I chose to give money
Stingy tipping
You are at a restaurant with friends.  When the bill comes, your friends comment on how slow 
the service was and say they're only going to tip 10%.  This is lower than you usually tip.  You 
end up tipping 10% to the server.
Which of these is a better description of your behavior:
Choice 1: I just did what my friends did
Choice 2: I decided to lower my tip because of the service
Going out
It's a Wednesday night and you have to finish a project by the next morning.  Your friends want 
you to go out with them. You end up going out for a few hours that evening then working on 
your project.
Which of these is a better description of your behavior:
Choice 1: I gave in to peer pressure
Choice 2: I decided to split my time
Jaywalking
You are waiting at an intersection and the “Do not walk” sign is lit.  Nonetheless, there is no 
traffic, and the person in front of you starts to cross against the light.  You cross also.
Which of these is a better description of your behavior:
Choice 1: I did what the person in front of me did
Choice 2: I decided not to wait any longer
Entree selection
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You are going out to dinner.  You think you'll order your regular dish, but the waiter says that the
evening's special is absolutely delicious.  In the end, you decide to order the special.
Which of these is a better description of your behavior:
Choice 1: The waiter changed my mind
Choice 2: I changed my mind
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